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THE BENEFITS OF CAPTURE
Dorit Rubinstein Reiss*
INTRODUCTION
[N]ot all capture is bad. It surely is bad for regulators to
believe that 'what's good for General Motors is good for
America'; but it is also undesirable for regulators to believe
that 'what's bad for General Motors is of no consequence to
America'.'
Observers of the administrative state warn against capture of
administrative agencies and lament its disastrous effects. This
Article suggests that the term "capture," applied to a close
relationship between industry and regulator, is not useful; by
stigmatizing that relationship-judging the relationship as
problematic from the start-the stigmatization hides the
relationships potential benefits. The literature on capture
highlights its negative results: lax enforcement of regulation, weak
regulations, and illicit benefits going to industry. This picture,
however, is incomplete and in substantial tension with another
current strand of literature which encourages collaboration between
industry and regulator. The collaboration literature draws on the
fact that industry input into the regulatory process has important
benefits for the regulatory state. Industry usually has information
no one else has and has more incentive to give that information to a
friendly regulator. Furthermore, working with industry can
substantially improve the impact of regulation; voluntary
compliance is cheaper and can be more effective than enforced
* Associate Professor, UC Hastings College of the Law. I would like to
thank Mark Aaronson, Hadar Aviram, Ash Bhagwat, Abe Cable, Daniel
Carpenter, Marsha Cohen, David Coolidge, John Crawford, Annie Daher, Ben
Depoorter, Christopher Elmendorf, Heather Field, Beth Hillman, Alicia Jovais,
Robert Kagan, Chimene Keitner, Heather Kelly, Evan Lee, Ethan Leib, John
Leshy, David Levine, Richard Marcus, Jerry Mashaw, Osagie Obasogie, Roger
Park, Radhika Rao, Reuel Schiller, David Schorr, Darien Shanske, Gail
Silverstein, Brendon Swedlow, David Takacs, and Joan Williams for invaluable
comments and suggestions in earlier stages of the project and on earlier drafts,
and Erica Anderson and Fatemeh Shahangian for excellent research assistance.
All errors are, of course, my own.
1. Toni Makkai & John Braithwaite, In and Out of the Revolving Door:
Making Sense of Regulatory Capture, 12 J. PUB. POL'Y 61, 72-73 (1992).
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compliance, and industry can help regulators minimize negative
unintended consequences. This Article suggests that instead of
engaging in name calling, we should focus on identifying when a
close industry-regulator relationship will work in the public interest
and when it is likely to undermine it. That is an empirical question.
For decades, scholars have discussed capture of administrative
agencies-mainly, though not exclusively, by industry9-strictly in
terms of the negative consequences. 3 If "accountability" is often
seen as the "hurrah word" of the administrative state, 4 capture can
be seen as the "boo-word"; historically, up until quite recently, few
have had anything good to say about it.5 The term capture itself is a
discussion ender; if an agency is said to be "captured," the
regulatory results are presumed to be bad. Like most negative
labels, this presumption tends to obstruct efforts to arrive at the
kind of clear understanding that leads to good policy prescriptions.
Capture refers to an extremely close relationship between
regulators and industry.6  Some believe such a relationship is
inherently dangerous and negative. Reports prepared by Ralph
2. Scholars have also discussed concerns about capture by
Nongovernmental Organizations ("NGOs") and other interest groups. See, e.g.,
Dieter Helm, Regulatory Reform, Capture, and the Regulatory Burden, 22
OXFORD REV. EcoN. POL'Y 169, 172-75 (2006); Richard L. Revesz & Allison L.
Westfahl Kong, Regulatory Change and Optimal Transition Relief, 105 Nw. U.
L. REV. 1581, 1604-07 (2011). However, most of the scholarship focuses on the
connection between industry and the regulator, and the case studies explore
that situation. I will therefore use language focusing on industry, while
acknowledging that there can be capture by other actors.
3. Capture has been discussed at least since the 1950s. See MARVER H.
BERNSTEIN, REGULATING BUSINESS BY INDEPENDENT COMMISSION 268-71, 277-79
(1955). Kenneth Culp Davis describes Bernstein's work as "[t]ypical of the
prevailing attitude among the present generation of political scientists." 1
KENNETH CULP DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 1.03, at 16 n.2 (1958). It
is still a topic of discussion today. See, e.g., Steven P. Croley, Theories of
Regulation: Incorporating the Administrative Process, 98 CoLUM. L. REV. 1, 1-7
(1998); Amitai Etzioni, The Capture Theory of Regulations-Revisited, 46 Soc'Y
319, 319-20 (2009); Michael E. Levine & Jennifer L. Forrence, Regulatory
Capture, Public Interest, and the Public Agenda: Toward a Synthesis, 6 J.L.
EcoN. & ORG. 167, 178-79 (1990); Makkai & Braithwaite, supra note 1, at 62;
Sidney A. Shapiro & Rena Steinzor, Capture, Accountability, and Regulatory
Metrics, 86 TEX. L. REV. 1741, 1742, 1745-46, 1756, 1759 (2008); Wendy E.
Wagner, Administrative Law, Filter Failure, and Information Capture, 59 DUKE
L.J. 1321, 1321, 1328-34 (2010).
4. Mark Bovens, Public Accountability, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF
PUBLIC MANAGEMENT 182, 182 (Ewan Ferlie et al. eds., 2005) ("As a concept,
however, 'public accountability' is rather elusive. It is a hurrah-word, like
'learning,' 'responsibility,' or 'solidarity'-nobody can be against it.").
5. See infra notes 60-61 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
more "optimistic" strands of literature about capture.
6. See infra Part L.A for a more thorough definition of capture.
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Nader's associates, the "Nader's Raiders,"7 reflect that spirit. For
example, the Nader report on the Food and Drug Administration
("FDA") saw the FDA as a puppet in the hands of industry and
claimed that "when the law allows administrative discretion,
industry, not the consumer, benefits."8 It evaluated the FDA's
supervision of firms and criticized its presumption that almost all
manufacturers can be trusted to place the public interest before
profit.9 The report strongly criticized the FDA's decisions to attempt
to educate firms about the need for compliance rather than punish
them for noncompliance.' 0
In the same vein, the group's study of the Federal Aviation
Administration ("FAA") accused the regulators of being so closely
related to the industry that they promoted the industry's interests
over consumers' safety.11 The problem with this approach is that it
is one sided. Yes, a cozy relationship between regulator and
industry creates risks and may (though not inevitably) lead to
terrible outcomes. But an adversarial relationship between industry
and regulator has its own costs, can itself lead to extremely negative
outcomes, and thus has also been justifiably criticized. 12
But it's not just about what is the least worst choice. A close
relationship between agency and regulators can provide substantial
benefits. It can improve the information available to an agency, and
it can improve regulatory results by increasing compliance and
preventing negative unintended consequences. 13 This is why, in the
last few decades, a substantial amount of literature promoted more
collaborative government with closer ties and even partnerships
between the private sector and regulators.
While capture has benefits on its own, it should not be
evaluated in a vacuum.' 4 Rather, we should ask what the realistic
7. Martha Chamallas, The Disappearing Consumer, Cognitive Bias and
Tort Law, 6 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 9, 18 (2000).
8. JAMES S. TURNER, THE CHEMICAL FEAST: THE RALPH NADER STUDY
GROUP REPORT ON FOOD PROTECTION AND THE FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION
18(1970).
9. Id. at 37.
10. Id.
11. RALPH NADER & WESLEY J. SMITH, COLLISION COURSE: THE TRUTH ABOUT
AIRLINE SAFETY 83-89 (1994).
12. EUGENE BARDACH & ROBERT A. KAGAN, GOING BY THE BOOK: THE
PROBLEM OF REGULATORY UNREASONABLENESS 102-19 (1982); ROBERT A. KAGAN,
ADVERSARIAL LEGALISM: THE AMERICAN WAY OF LAW 195-98 (2001) [hereinafter
KAGAN, ADVERSARIAL LEGALISM]; George J. Busenberg, Collaborative and
Adversarial Analysis in Environmental Policy, 32 POL'Y SCI. 1, 1-2 (1999).
13. RUSSELL W. MILLS, THE PROMISE OF COLLABORATIVE VOLUNTARY
PARTNERSHIPS: LESSONS FROM THE FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION 14-16
(2010).
14. See generally NEIL K. KOMESAR, IMPERFECT ALTERNATIVES: CHOOSING
INSTITUTIONS IN LAW, ECONOMICS, AND PUBLIC POLICY 3-7 (1994) (arguing for a
comparative institutional analysis); Jeb Barnes, In Defense of Asbestos Tort
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alternatives are and which realistic alternative will achieve the best
result. Sometimes capture will achieve better results than other
options. 15 Other times it will at least achieve results that are good
enough, or better than, the previous status quo.16
The real question is not simply whether "it is good or bad."
What we should be studying is when would a cozy agency-industry
relationship lead to benefits and when would it lead to harm, in
light of existing alternatives. To understand the effects of agency-
industry relationship and to make informed policy decisions with
that information in mind, we should examine that question
theoretically and empirically with as little bias as possible.
This Article makes three contributions to the literature. First,
it makes the point that there is an overlap between the literature on
capture and the literature on collaboration, since both address a
close relationship between regulator and industry and the results of
such a relationship. It then explicitly analyzes possible distinctions
between the two concepts, concluding that the distinction between a
situation of capture and a situation of collaboration is a matter of
degree or of post-hoc evaluation of the results. Second, it suggests
that a close relationship between industry and regulator has
important benefits and describes those benefits. Finally, it argues
that, thus far, the question of which factors increase the potential
benefits and which factors increase the risks has been understudied.
This is an empirical question. A proper study of this question
requires theorization and careful examination in real life context.
This Article takes a first stab at answering this question by
suggesting such factors.
This Article is a thought piece. It draws on existing work and
current examples to suggest a rethinking of existing scholarship. It
sets out a research agenda for future empirical research. It does not
itself, however, contain new empirical data (though I am in the
process of conducting three such empirical studies).
Part I defines the terms capture and collaboration and describes
the literature addressing them. It demonstrates that the terms
overlap and there is no clear distinction. While the literature on
capture and collaboration teaches us important insights about the
relationship between agencies and industry, a discussion that goes
beyond each alone is necessary. Part II addresses the potential
risks and promises of a close relationship between industry and
Litigation: Rethinking Legal Process Analysis in a World of Uncertainty, Second
Bests, and Shared Policy-Making Responsibility, 34 LAw & Soc. INQUIRY 5, 6-7,
11 (2009) (arguing that under an institutional analysis, as opposed to a pure
legal process analysis, asbestos litigation serves as a reasonable use of judicial
power).
15. Ian Ayres & John Braithwaite, Tripartism: Regulatory Capture and
Empowerment, 16 LAw & Soc. INQUIRY 435, 451-56 (1991).
16. Id.
572 [Vol. 47
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regulator. Part III suggests factors that can determine whether a
close relationship is beneficial or harmful. The Article then
concludes by summarizing the paper's contribution and explaining
avenues for future research.
I. CAPTURE V. COLLABORATION
Consider the following two examples of agency-industry
interaction.
Since 1975, the FAA has been making use of voluntary
reporting programs to allow airlines and airline personnel to report
safety problems in return for a guaranteed waiver of sanctions.17
Between 1990 and 2009, the FAA entered into agreements for
voluntary reporting programs with seventy-three carriers.18 In
2001, the FAA promulgated a regulation' 9 guaranteeing that it
would not use voluntarily submitted safety information for punitive
actions, nor would the information be released to third parties under
the Freedom of Information Act.2 0 This removed a substantial
source of concern for the airlines in relation to the voluntary
reporting programs and increased the use of such programs. 21
Cynics would say this is exactly what industry wanted and is clearly
the result of capture. It allows airlines to get away with violations
of safety regulations without sanction because their close
connections with the regulators assure them there will be none.
In 2007, a large number of Southwest Airlines planes were
found to be in violation of an airworthiness directive, 22 and in some
cases, parts were showing fatigue cracks (such cracks themselves
are not an immediate problem, but their presence is the first sign of
the approach of catastrophic failure).23  Apparently, an FAA
17. Except in narrow circumstances, the FAA would not waive sanctions for
problems resulting from criminal behavior or for problems disclosed in
anticipation of an FAA inspection or during one. MILLS, supra note 13, at 17-
19. Other agencies have also adopted voluntary reporting programs. See, e.g.,
Jodi L. Short & Michael W. Toffel, Coerced Confessions: Self-Policing in the
Shadow of the Regulator, 24 J.L. EcoN. & ORG. 45, 46, 62-65 (2008).
18. Russell W. Mills, The Development of Collaborative Regulatory
Partnerships with Industry: A Historical Institutionalist Investigation of the
Federal Aviation Administration's Voluntary Safety Reporting Programs 26
(Apr. 2, 2010) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author) [hereinafter Mills,
Collaborative Regulatory Partnerships]; see also MILLS, COLLABORATIVE
VOLUNTARY PARTNERSHIPS, supra note 13.
19. 14 C.F.R. § 193 (2011).
20. Id.; see also 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2006).
21. MILLS, supra note 13, at 28.
22. Airworthiness directives are rules through which the FAA requires
airlines to employ certain safety measures in certain types of aircraft. See id. at
12.
23. Press Release, Fed. Aviation Admin., FAA Proposes $10.2 Million Civil
Penalty Against Southwest Airlines (Mar. 6, 2008), available at
http://www.faa.gov/news/press-releases/newsstory.cfm?newslD=10179; Judson
2012] 573
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inspector warned of the cracks as early as 2003, but nothing was
done because of the close relationship between Principal
Maintenance Inspector Douglas Gawadzinski and senior
management at Southwest Airlines. 24 The connections were so close
that FAA personnel allowed Southwest to fly problematic aircraft
and even warned Southwest in advance of upcoming inspections. 25
In April 2011, a tragedy was narrowly averted when a
Southwest plane was forced to make an emergency landing because
of a catastrophic failure of sections of fuselage skin26-the inevitable
result of neglected fatigue cracks. 27 This may be seen as an
indication that the FAA and Southwest have returned to their cozy
relationship with potentially dangerous results, but this is probably
not the case. Mistakes can be made even without capture, and the
National Transportation Safety Board's ("NTSB") investigation
suggested this was such a case; apparently, none of the parties
involved believed the part of the airplane in which the cracks
occurred was stressed in a way that would lead to catastrophic
failure.28 The FAA responded to the near accident by immediately
issuing an emergency directive requiring detailed inspections of
certain aircraft models when they accumulated 30,000 flight cycles,
Berger, Southwest Has History of Triggering FAA Action, FoxNEWS.COM (Apr. 4,
2011), http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2011/04/04/southwest-history-triggering
-faa-action/.
24. Mills, Collaborative Regulatory Partnerships, supra note 18, at 4-5.
25. Id. at 5-6.
26. The relevant part broke up and immediately lost all functionality.
Walter Berry & Lien Hoang, 'Fuselage Rupture' Forces Emergency Landing On
Southwest Airlines Flight, HUFFINGTON POST (Apr. 2, 2011),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/04/02/fuselage-rupture-forces-emergency
-landing-southwest_n_843925.html. The plane shed five feet of exterior skin,
"an approximately 9-inch wide by 59-inch long rectangular-shaped hole," and
opened the passenger cabin to the outside environment, which was the
stratosphere. Rapid Decompression Due to Fuselage Rupture, NAT'L TRANSP.
SAFETY BOARD, http://www.ntsb.gov/investigations/2011/yuma-az.html (last
visited Sept. 2, 2012). That in itself is life threatening even if the plane does
not fall out of the sky. See id.
27. Press Release, Fed. Aviation Admin., FAA Will Mandate Inspections for
Early Models of 737 Aircraft (Apr. 4, 2011), available at http://www.faa.gov
/news/press-releases/news story.cfm?newslD=12621.
28. The NTSB's press release on the accident suggested that all
maintenance inspections were conducted, there were no discrepancies, and
there was no sign of apparent wrongdoing. Press Release, Nat'l Transp. Safety
Bd., NTSB Continues Investigation of Southwest Flight 812 (Apr. 25, 2011),
available at http://www.ntsb.gov/news/2011/110425.html. What seemed to
happen is that the FAA, the airline, and the manufacturer did not believe the
specific part of the plane warranted attention on a plane of this age; therefore,
they did not expect cracks in it, and so no one checked for it. NTSBgov, NTSB
Final Press Briefing SWA Flight 812 Apr 4 2011, YOUTuBE (Apr. 4, 2011),
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v-IyQxU2OAtaA. "It was not an area that was
believed could fail," said the NTSB board member. Id.
[Vol. 47574
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and thereafter at intervals of 500 flight cycles.29 The combination of
the NTSB's findings and FAA's rapid response suggests a common
mistake rather than regulatory failure.
This complex picture suggests that the relationship between the
FAA and industry could give critics substantial cause for concern.
But if you take a step back and look at the general picture, what
were the effects on air safety?
Allowing the airlines to disclose information without penalty
increased the availability of information.30 A study by an
independent scholar put the total number of reports generated at
approximately 900,000 (compared to no avenue to submit such
reports before the program was created).31 As pointed out by the
Government Accountability Office ("GAO"), such data provide
information that cannot be found in any other way.3 2 It may have
led to fewer punitive measures against airlines, but if the goal was
to make air travel safer-not just punish airlines-it seemed to help
by increasing the available information. In a recent piece, Russell
Mills, who has been studying these programs for a long time,
demonstrated a connection between the voluntary reporting and the
FAA's airworthiness directives, showing that they made a difference
(presumably-though it's hard to measure-for the better) in the
regulation of air safety.33
An independent review team said the following about the
programs: "We are phenomenally impressed with what this agency
29. FAA Docket No. 2011-0348, Airworthiness Directive 7 (May 6, 2011),
available at http://rgl.faa.gov/Regulatory-andGuidanceLibrary/rgAD.nsf/0
/cb59b54e49d84ede86257894004955d8/$FILE/2011-08-51.pdf.
30. MILLS, supra note 13, at 32-33. This view is also raised in the medical
context. See, e.g., Michael R. Cohen, Why Error Reporting Systems Should be
Voluntary, 320 BRIT. MED. J. 728, 729 (2000). Cohen, president of the Institute
for Safe Medication Practices and a well-credentialed pharmacist and scholar,
argues that when disclosure is used primarily to punish the wrongdoer
(creating a "fear of retribution") rather than to create solutions, it has a stifling
effect on disclosure: "[N]on-punitive and confidential voluntary reporting
programmes provide more useful information about errors and their causes
than mandatory reporting programmes.. .. Practitioners who are forced to
report errors are less likely to provide in depth information because their
primary motivation is self protection and adherence to a requirement ..... Id.
at 729.
31. MILLS, supra note 13, at 17.
32. U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-10-414, AVIATION SAFETY:
IMPROVED DATA QUALITY AND ANALYSIS CAPABILITIES ARE NEEDED AS FAA PLANS
A RISK-BASED APPROACH TO SAFETY OVERSIGHT (2010), available at
http://www.gao.gov/assets/310/304182.pdf.
33. Russell W. Mills, Collaborating with Industry to Ensure Regulatory
Oversight: The Use of Voluntary Safety Reporting Programs by the Federal
Aviation Administration 156-57 (May 2011) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation,
Kent State University), available at http://etd.ohiolink.edulsend-pdf.cgilMills
%20Russell%2OWilliam.pdfkentl3O2lO2713.
2012] 575
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has achieved, in collaboration with the aviation industry, in driving
accident rates down to extraordinarily low levels."34
The rate of fatal accidents among commercial carriers is
extremely low, and has dropped dramatically since the 1960s.3 5
While I cannot connect the reduction causally to voluntary
reporting-because there were many other factors-the close
relationship certainly did not harm, and possibly helped, the
situation.
Now consider as a counter the story of the Minerals
Management Service ("MMS").36 The MMS received negative
attention on two occasions between 2005 and 2010. In the first case,
a lengthy investigation of its Royalty in Kind program exposed a
series of ethical problems (described by the Inspector General of the
Department of the Interior as a "[c]ulture of [eJthical [fJailure"). 37
The MMS collected royalties from companies harvesting minerals
from the continental shelf and some federal lands pursuant to
leases. 38 The Royalty in Kind program allowed the agency to receive
a percentage of the oil or gas collected by the companies and sell it
in lieu of cash royalties.39 This became a substantial source of
revenue. 40 The investigation by the Department of the Interior
revealed a culture of receiving gifts from industry members-mostly
of food, drinks, and lodging (in violation of federal ethics
guidelines)-and of alcohol and drug abuse during industry-
organized parties (in two cases agency members had to be lodged by
34. EDWARD W. STIMPSON ET AL., MANAGING RISKS IN CIVIL AVIATION: A
REVIEW OF THE FAA's APPROACH TO SAFETY 56 (2008), available at
http://www.osc.gov/FY20O/Scanned/10-11%20DI-07-2793%20and%20DI-07-
2868/DI-07-2793%2OAgency%20Report%20%20(Part%203).pdf.
35. Id. at 65 app. 3.
36. Following a reorganization in 2010, the agency was restructured and is
now named the "Bureau of Ocean Energy Management, Regulation and
Enforcement." Salazar Swears-In Michael R. Bromwich to Lead Bureau of
Energy Management, Regulation and Enforcement, BUREAU OF OCEAN ENERGY
MGMT., REG. & ENFORCEMENT (Jun. 21, 2010), http://www.boemre.gov
/ooc/press/2010/pressO621.htm. Here, however, all the examples described date
from before the reorganization, and the sources I used refer to the agency as the
"Mineral Management Service." I therefore considered it less confusing to use
the old name here.
37. Memorandum from Earl E. Devaney, Inspector Gen., U.S. Dep't of the
Interior, to Dirk Kempthorne, Sec. of the Interior 1-3 (Sept. 9, 2008), available
at http://republicans.transportation.house.gov/Media/file/111thlCGMT/OilSpill
-OIG Report_2008.pdf (regarding OIG investigations of MMS employees).
38. DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., INVESTIGATIVE
REPORT OF MMS OIL MARKETING GROUP - LAKEWOOD 1 (2008) [hereinafter
INVESTIGATIVE REPORT], available at http://media.washingtonpost.com/wp-
srv/investigative/documents/mmsoil
-081908.pdf .
39. Id. at 1-2.
40. Id. at 1-2, 4.
[Vol. 47576
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the industry because they were too drunk to go home).41 There was
evidence of relaxation of the rules in favor of the regulated
companies, especially in allowing industry members to change bids
after winning them. 4 2
To complete the picture of a captured agency in thrall to its
regulatees, other government officials accused the MMS of lax
regulation and carelessness in providing BP with its drilling permit
after the BP scandal.43 Mary Kendall, Acting Inspector General for
the Department of the Interior, criticized MMS regulation as being
"heavily reliant on industry to document and accurately report on
operations, production and royalties" and pointed out that "[b]ecause
MMS relies heavily on the industry that it regulates in so many
areas, however, the possibility for, and perception of, undue
influence will likely remain."44 The agency was criticized for
exempting BP from producing an Environmental Impact
Statement-something the agency regularly did for offshore drilling
in the Gulf of Mexico.45
In spite of this image of a captured agency and the clearly
problematic behavior of some of its employees, a recent in-depth
empirical examination of the agency's structure and its history
suggests that the accusations of capture obfuscate potentially deeper
causes of the problems in the way the MMS functions; many of the
problems the MMS ran into are the result of conflicting roles
assigned to it, which may have influenced its collaborative approach,
and this will not be fixed by the reorganization of the agency. 46
These two examples serve two purposes. First, at least some of
the behaviors of both agencies can be classified as either
41. Id. at 10-31.
42. Id. at 11.
43. See, e.g., Perry Bacon, Jr. et al., Lawmakers Assail Minerals
Management Service, WASH. POST (May 26, 2010),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/05/26
/AR2010052602787.html (explaining that members of both parties of Congress
criticized the MMS); see also Kathy Finn, Two Years After BP Oil Spill, Tourists
Back in U.S. Gulf, REUTERS (May 27, 2012), http://www.reuters.com
/article/2012/05/27/usa-bpspill-tourism-idUSLE8GP5X20120527 (discussing
oil spill from BP oil well in Gulf of Mexico on April 20, 2010).
44. The Deepwater Horizon Incident: Are the Minerals Management Service
Regulations Doing the Job? Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Energy & Mineral
Res., 111th Cong. 13-15 (2010) (statement of Mary L. Kendall, Acting Inspector
General, Department of the Interior), available at http://www.gpo.gov
/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-111hhrg56979/pdf/CHRG-111hhrg56979.pdf.
45. Jaclyn Lopez, BP's Well Evaded Environmental Review: Categorical
Exclusion Policy Remains Unchanged, 37 ECOLOGY L. CURRENTS 93, 95-98
(2010).
46. But see Christopher Carrigan, Minerals Management Service and
Deepwater Horizon: What Role Should Capture Play?, in PREVENTING CAPTURE:
SPECIAL INTEREST INFLUENCE IN REGULATION, AND How To LIMIT IT (Daniel
Carpenter & David Moss eds., forthcoming) (manuscript at 56-58) (discussing
that the MMS was not, as a whole, captured).
2012]1 577
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collaboration or capture, depending on the observer's point of view.
Second, they highlight the fact that the kind of close relationship
that can be classified as capture can either yield benefits or lead to
disastrous results.
A. Capture in the Literature
Capture focuses on close connections between a regulator and
the industry it regulates.47  The literature uses a variety of
definitions to explain the results or features of capture. One
definition suggests that in a situation of capture, regulated industry
members "persuade regulators to alter rules or be lenient in
enforcing those rules."48 A somewhat different definition
emphasizes the consequences, suggesting that captured regulatory
agencies are "persistently serving the interests of regulated
industries to the neglect or harm of more general, or 'public,'
interests.... [T]he accusation implies excessive regulated industry
influence on regulatory agencies."49
Carpenter and Moss suggest that capture "is the result or
process by which regulation (in law or application) is, at least
partially, by intent and action of the industry regulated, consistently
or repeatedly directed away from the public interest and towards
the interests of the regulated industry."so
Braithwaite and Makkai made the capture analysis more
nuanced by breaking it into three related but not necessarily
simultaneous behaviors-sympathy to industry (implying excessive
47. BERNSTEIN, supra note 3, at 268; JEAN-JACQUEs LAFFONT & JEAN
TIROLE, A THEORY OF INCENTIVES IN PROCUREMENT AND REGULATION 475-80
(1993); Jon Hanson & David Yosifon, The Situation: An Introduction to the
Situational Character, Critical Realism, Power Economics, and Deep Capture,
152 U. PA. L. REV. 129, 202-05 (2003); Richard B. Stewart, The Reformation of
American Administrative Law, 88 HARv. L. REV. 1667, 1685 (1975).
48. Craig W. Thomas et al., Special Interest Capture of Regulatory Agencies:
A Ten-Year Analysis of Voting Behavior on Regional Fishery Management
Councils, 38 POL'Y STUD. J. 447, 448 (2010). There is room in the literature for
an article identifying different types of behavior that fall under the definition of
capture and then addressing each type separately. That is not this Article. As
the literature review demonstrates here, scholarship focusing on a specific type
of capture, such as the revolving door, exists. See, e.g., Ernesto Dal B6,
Regulatory Capture: A Review, 22 OXFORD REV. OF ECoN. POL'Y 203, 214-15
(2006). But much of the literature speaks in much more general terms. See,
e.g., STEVEN P. CROLEY, REGULATION AND PUBLIC INTERESTS: THE POSSIBILITY OF
GOOD REGULATORY GOVERNMENT 26-29 (2008); MALCOLM K. SPARROW, THE
REGULATORY CRAFT: CONTROLLING RISKS, SoLVING PROBLEMS, AND MANAGING
COMPLIANCE 35, 37 (2000); Ayres & Braithwaite, supra note 15, at 436-39;
Makkai & Braithwaite, supra note 1.
49. PAUL J. QUIRK, INDUSTRY INFLUENCE IN FEDERAL REGULATORY AGENCIES
4 (1981).
50. Daniel Carpenter & David Moss, Introduction, in PREVENTING CAPTURE:
SPECIAL INTEREST INFLUENCE IN REGULATION, AND How To LIMIT IT, supra note
46 (manuscript at 20).
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sympathy), identification with industry's interest, and (unduly) lax
enforcement.51
This Article defines capture by emphasizing intentional
influence rather than whether the result deviates from the public
interest since, at the point of decision, agency decision can often be
plausibly seen to be in the public interest-or at least one definition
of it; the many aspects of the concept of public interest make a focus
on it less than helpful.52 It also does not distinguish between
influence and control, as Webb Yackee's article does,53 since I see
the distinction as a matter of degree, a continuum rather than a
dichotomy; at some point, influence is so strong as to become control,
but in the regulatory context, we are not usually talking about
absolute control by industry.
Any of these definitions inherently implies regularly repeated
interactions between the regulator and a certain industry. Capture
of the agency is not usually an issue when interaction between the
industry and the regulator is sporadic.5 4
This type of relationship has been known for a long time among
those inside the regulatory state. In an open letter about the
Interstate Commerce Commission ("ICC"), a famous practitioner
acknowledged that:
The Commission, as its functions have now been limited by the
courts, is, or can be made, of great use to the railroads. It
satisfies the popular clamor for a government supervision of
railroads, at the same time that the supervision is almost
entirely nominal. Further, the older such a commission gets to
be, the more inclined it will be found to be to take the business
and railroad view of things. It thus becomes a sort of barrier
between the railroad corporations and the people and a sort of
51. Makkai & Braithwaite, supra note 1, at 64, 66.
52. James Kwak, Cultural Capture and the Financial Crisis, in
PREVENTING CAPTURE: SPECIAL INTEREST INFLUENCE IN REGULATION, AND How TO
LIMIT IT, supra note 46 (manuscript at 4-7).
53. Susan Webb Yackee, Reconsidering Agency Capture During Regulatory
Policymaking, in PREVENTING CAPTURE: SPECIAL INTEREST INFLUENCE IN
REGULATION, AND How To LIMIT IT, supra note 46 (manuscript at 10).
54. See IAN AYRES & JOHN BRAITHWAITE, RESPONSIVE REGULATION:
TRANSCENDING THE DEREGULATION DEBATE 55-56 (Donald R. Harris et al. eds.,
1992) ("Where relationships are ongoing, where encounters are regularly
repeated with the same regulator, corruption is more rewarding for both
parties: the regulator can collect recurring bribe payments and the firm can
benefit from repeated purchases of lower standards. Moreover, ongoing
relationships permit the slow sounding out of the corruptibility and
trustworthiness of the other to stand by corrupt bargains (and at minimum risk
because an identical small number of players are involved each time)."); Neil
Gunningham, Assessing Responsive Regulation 'on the Ground': Where Does It
Work? 3 (2011) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the author).
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protection against hasty and crude legislation hostile to
railroad interests.55
Research on capture surged in the 1950s, with Marver
Bernstein's influential work on independent commissions.56
Bernstein suggested that, while a regulatory regime starts
vigorously and with energy, over time its supporting coalition
dissolves, the energy dissipates, and the agency starts to kowtow to
the preferences of industry, finally seeing its own interests as
completely identical to that of the regulated industry.5 7
Bernstein's work was extremely influential-though it was not
without critics from early on.58 In the subsequent public policy
literature, capture was uniformly seen as a substantial concern.59
Even the more "optimistic" studies were optimistic either by
suggesting that sometimes agencies avoid capture60 or by
challenging the prevalence of the phenomenon.6 1
In 1971, capture was discovered by the economic literature with
Stigler's seminal article62 in which he claimed that regulation will,
in the end, work for the benefit of the regulated industry, not the
public, and that industry will have the most influence on its
content.63 His approach was given some refinement and algebraic
55. Letter from Richard Olney, Att'y Gen., to Charles E. Perkins, President
of the Chi., Burlington & Quincy R.R. (1892), quoted in Louis L. Jaffe, The
Effective Limits of the Administrative Process: A Reevaluation, 67 HARv. L. REV.
1105, 1109 n.7 (1954).
56. BERNSTEIN, supra note 3, at 3-8.
57. Id. at 83-102.
58. For a summary of previous criticisms and an additional one, see Paul
Sabatier, Social Movements and Regulatory Agencies: Toward a More
Adequate-and Less Pessimistic-Theory of "Clientele Capture", 6 POL'Y SCI. 301,
303-05 (1975). Among the criticisms mentioned is that often legislation is
designed to promote close connections between industry and regulator and that
Bernstein's assumptions that the agency cannot mobilize a supporting
constituency to counteract industry influence and that the supporting coalition
inevitably disperses or loses interest are problematic. Id. at 305.
59. See, e.g., NADER & SMITH, supra note 11, at 59-60, 83-86; TURNER,
supra note 8, at 37-41, 120-21.
60. William D. Berry, An Alternative to the Capture Theory of Regulation:
The Case of State Public Utility Commissions, 28 AM. J. POL. Scl. 524, 524-27
(1984); Sabatier, supra note 58, at 304.
61. CROLEY, supra note 48, at 50-51; Richard A. Posner, The Behavior of
Administrative Agencies, 1 J. LEGAL STUD. 305, 315-16 (1972).
62. See generally George J. Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2
BELL J. EcON. & MGMT. Sci. 3 (1971) [hereinafter Stigler, Economic Regulation].
This essay followed a previous article by Stigler and Friedland, in which they
examined the effect of regulation in the electricity sector and concluded it had
little effect. See George J. Stigler & Claire Friedland, What Can Regulators
Regulate? The Case of Electricity, 5 J.L. & EcoN. 1, 11-12 (1962).
63. Stigler, Economic Regulation, supra note 62, at 3-7.
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formulation by Peltzman.64 The Stigler-Peltzman approach was a
challenge to the then-existing conventional wisdom that regulation
was justified as a response to market failure, since it was the only
way to protect against such failures. 65  In contrast, Stigler-
Peltzman's findings suggested that regulation was not the answer
because it would not work to prevent market failures but would
instead reinforce them by giving more power to the regulated
industry.66 The implied corollary was that market mechanisms are
a better solution to market failures. 67
The Stigler-Peltzman approach achieved prominence and
generated substantial follow-up work,68 though the economic
literature on the causes and consequences was mostly theoretical
with scant empirical support.69 The political science literature on
the topic, however, did offer one careful, detailed cross-agency study
on the factors leading to capture: Paul Quirk's 1981 study of the
factors increasing the potential for capture. 70
Much of the literature examined the potential incentives
industry can offer regulators to encourage cooperation.71 A more
specialized strand of literature focused on the revolving door effects,
and strongly argued that movement from industry to the regulator
and back leads to capture and to regulators wanting to curry favor
with industry.72
Not exactly fitting into either category, studies in regulation
and law found similar results. Studies of the rulemaking process in
the United States found substantive influence by industry on the
content of regulation. 73 In a recent study, Shapiro and Steinzor not
64. Sam Peltzman, Toward a More General Theory of Regulation, 19 J.L. &
EcoN. 211, 211-13 (1976). Among other things, Peltzman suggests that where
industry influence conflicts with other influences, the result will usually not be
completely caving to industry or to consumers but somewhere in between-
though it will lean towards industry. Id. at 227-30.
65. Sam Peltzman, The Economic Theory of Regulation After a Decade of
Deregulation, 1989 BROOKINGS PAPERS ON EcON. AcTIVITY MICROECONOMICS 1,
4-5.
66. Id.; see also Dal B6, supra note 48, at 206-07.
67. Dal B6, supra note 48, at 204, 207-11.
68. CROLEY, supra note 48, at 9-13, 20-21, 59-60; FIONA HAINES, THE
PARADOX OF REGULATION: WHAT REGULATION CAN ACHIEVE AND WHAT IT CANNOT
12-30 (2011); Dal B6, supra note 48, at 204, 206.
69. Dal B6, supra note 48, at 215-16.
70. QUIRK, supra note 49, at 16-21.
71. Dal B6, supra note 48, at 207-13.
72. Id. at 214-15. Dal B6 also addresses two studies that suggested some
positive influences to the revolving door. Id. at 217-19.
73. CORNELIUS M. KERWIN, RULEMAKING: How GOVERNMENT AGENCIES
WRITE LAW AND MAKE POLICY 182-84 (3d ed. 2003) ("Businesses . .. are involved
in rulemaking more often than are other groups, and they devote to it greater
slices of their likely larger budgets and staffs."); Berry, supra note 60, at 525-
26; Croley,supra note 3, at 126-31; Marissa Martino Golden, Interest Groups in
the Rule-Making Process: Ww Participates? Whose Voices Get Heard?, 8 J. PUB.
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only found such influence but explained that it is especially strong
where salience (towards the public) is low and technological
complexity high.74
Most of these studies accept capture as a reality-and a
negative one-and discuss what leads to capture and how to prevent
it. Two exceptions stand out.
Recently, Dan Carpenter challenged the existing evidence used
in previous studies of capture from Stigler onwards. In a study that
straddled economic and political science literature, Carpenter
suggested that deducing capture from regulatory results that seem
to favor established firms is problematic since there are other
reasons for that kind of advantage, some of which are actually in the
public interest.75 In other words, you cannot conclude that, just
because established firms, large firms, and repeat players do better
under the regulatory system, the regulator is captured; there may be
other reasons for those results.76
In two more studies, regulation scholar Braithwaite and several
collaborators went beyond previous literature and suggested that
capture may be positive or negative, depending on the
circumstances.
In the first study, Ayres and Braithwaite suggested, as part of
their discussion of Responsive Regulation,77 that there are some
forms of capture that actually enhance social welfare and are
efficient.78 For example, one possible effect of capture is that it
motivates the agency and the industry to move from a situation in
which neither cooperates-a firm evades the law and the agency
behaves in a punitive manner-to one where both cooperate-the
firm obeys the spirit of the law and works to achieve the regulatory
goal, and the agency moves to flexible enforcement, ignoring
ADMIN. RES. & THEORY 245, 259-64 (1998); Jason Webb Yackee & Susan Webb
Yackee, A Bias Towards Business? Assessing Interest Group Influence on the
U.S. Bureaucracy, 68 J. POL. 128, 133-35 (2006). But see Mariano-Florentino
Cubllar, Rethinking Regulatory Democracy, 57 ADMIN. L. REV. 411, 435-59, 497-
99 (2005) (finding substantial participation by lay people and public interest
groups in three rulemakings and finding that the sophistication of the
comments, rather than the identity of the commentator, determines whether a
comment influences the agency's decision).
74. Shapiro & Steinzor, supra note 3, at 1752-55.
75. Daniel P. Carpenter, Protection Without Capture: Product Approval by
a Politically Responsive, Learning Regulator, 98 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 613, 614-15,
625-26 (2004).
76. Carpenter & Moss, supra note 50 (manuscript at 10-13, 17)
(elaborating upon and discussing the idea that claims of capture are often
supported by sketchy and problematic evidence).
77. In discussing the idea of "tripartism," the authors suggest NGOs can
serve as a counter to industry influence. AYRES & BRAITHWAITE, supra note 54,
at 54-73.
78. Id. at 65-69; Ayres & Braithwaite, supra note 15, at 452-56.
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technical violations. 79  This situation, explain Ayres and
Braithwaite, "is clearly Pareto efficient.... [And] will
unambiguously increase welfare" since it forces the agency to also
consider the firm's welfare when making decisions-and the firm is
part of society.80  This analysis is based on theoretical game
modeling.
A second study added empirical support to the view that some
types of capture are beneficial. This study, by Makkai and
Braithwaite, examined the concept of capture using empirical data
from the Australian nursing home industry.81 Makkai and
Braithwaite suggested that capture should be seen as a more
complex concept than was previously suggested, including three
factors: sympathy to problems industry confronts, identification
with industry, and lack of toughness in enforcement. 82 They found
very limited evidence that ties with industry (coming from industry
or returning to industry-the "revolving door" idea) increase
capture, and what evidence they found suggested weak effects.83
B. Collaboration
Especially in the past few decades, a whole strand of literature
has promoted reforms supporting closer ties between industry and
regulators and stronger industry participation in policy making and
enforcement. Much of this literature started as a response to the
problems of excessive regulation, command and control models, and
conflictual, adversarial relations between agencies and industry; the
solution proposed was generally the adoption of more negotiated,
consensus-based modes of regulation.84
79. AYRES & BRAITHWAITE, supra note 54, at 65.
80. Id.
81. Makkai & Braithwaite, supra note 1, at 62-64.
82. Id. at 64-66.
83. Id. at 69-72.
84. See, e.g., Deborah S. Dalton, Negotiated Rulemaking Changes EPA
Culture, in FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION DESKBOOK 135, 135-
52 (Marshall J. Breger et al. eds., 2001); Daniel J. Fiorino & Chris Kirtz,
Breaking Down Walls: Negotiated Rulemaking at EPA, 4 TEMP. ENVTL. L. &
TECH. J. 29, 29-30, 40 (1985); Daniel J. Fiorino, Regulatory Negotiation as a
Form of Public Participation, in FAIRNESS AND COMPETENCE IN CITIZEN
PARTICIPATION 223-25 (Ortwin Renn et al. eds., 1995); Daniel J. Fiorino,
Regulatory Policy and the Consensus Trap: An Agency Perspective, 19 ANALYSE
& KRITIK 64, 74-75 (1997); Jody Freeman, Collaborative Governance in the
Administrative State, 45 UCLA L. REV. 1, 97-98 (1997); Philip J. Harter,
Assessing the Assessors: The Actual Performance of Negotiated Rulemaking, 9
N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 32, 32-38, 52-54 (2000); Laura I. Langbein & Cornelius M.
Kerwin, Regulatory Negotiation Versus Conventional Rule Making: Claims,
Counterclaims, and Empirical Evidence, 10 J. PUB. ADMIN. RES. & THEORY 599,
599-600 (2000); Siobhan Mee, Negotiated Rulemaking and Combined Sewer
Overflows (CSOs): Consensus Saves Ossification?, 25 B.C. ENvTL. AFF. L. REV.
213, 213 (1997).
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There are two classical examples. First, in 1982, Bardach and
Kagan made a strong, compelling case for the "Good Inspector"
acting with forbearance and enforcing regulation with flexibility
(and toughness).85 Second, in Responsive Regulation, Ayres and
Braithwaite argued for a pyramid of enforcement that starts with
persuasion and escalates degrees of enforcement on the basis of
industry behavior. 86
Some studies promoted self-regulation by industry as a way to
make regulation more efficient and flexible. 87 Others recommended
"public-private partnerships" that would give more of a role to
private industry in making policy. 88 The Endangered Species Act is
one example of a program designed to give industry a direct input
into the content of regulation. The Act has been a source of
controversy between environmentalists and business interests for a
long time. 89 An amendment to the Act in 1982 allowed the
Secretary to approve a Habitat Conservation Plan, allowing a
landowner to interfere with an endangered species ("take" it) under
certain conditions.90 In theory, the option is available to any kind of
landowner; however, in practice, timber companies and real-estate
developers create most Habitat Conservation Plans.91 A Habitat
Conservation Plan is, in essence, an official compromise between the
private actor (usually a company) and the United States Forestry
and Wildlife Service, the agency in charge of implementing the
Endangered Species Act. 9 2 It is an invitation for businesses to
85. BARDACH & KAGAN, supra note 12, at 134-40.
86. AYRES & BRAITHWAITE, supra note 54, at 25-35. The authors expressly
address the tension between their approach and capture, and suggest a
solution, which I will address in Part I.C.
87. VIRGINIA HAUFLER, A PUBLIC ROLE FOR THE PRIVATE SECTOR 4 (2001);
Neil Gunningham & Joseph Rees, Industry Self-Regulation: An Institutional
Perspective, 19 LAw & PoL'Y 363, 363-66 (1997). For a detailed analysis of self-
regulation, including its strengths and weaknesses, see AYRES & BRAITHWAITE,
supra note 54, at 102-28.
88. For a recent overview of that literature, see Dominique Custos & John
Reitz, Public-Private Partnerships, 58 AM. J. COMP. L. 555, 555 (2010). For an
article expressing concerns about the effects of public-private partnerships on
accountability, see Martha Minow, Public and Private Partnerships: Accounting
for the New Religion, 116 HARV L. REV. 1229, 1255-59 (2003). For examples of
promoting such partnership in practice, see NOEL P. GREIS & MONICA L.
NOGUEIRA, FOOD SAFETY-EMERGING PUBLIC-PRIVATE APPROACHES: A
PERSPECTIVE FOR LOCAL, STATE, AND FEDERAL GOVERNMENT LEADERS 6-9 (2010);
CASSANDRA MOSELEY, STRATEGIES FOR SUPPORTING FRONTLINE COLLABORATION:
LESSONS FROM STEWARDSHIP CONTRACTING 6-8 (2010).
89. KENNETH M. MURCHISON, THE SNAIL DARTER CASE: TVA VERSUS THE
ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT 1-6, 193-98 (2007).
90. George F. Wilhere, Three Paradoxes of Habitat Conservation Plans, 44
ENVTL. MGMT. 1089, 1089-90 (2009).
91. Id. at 1090.
92. Id. at 1089.
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participate in policymaking. 93 Does this actually protect the
environment? The literature is undecided. Many studies express
concerns and criticisms.94 Others express cautious optimism as to
the process and its results.95
A movement emphasizing the use of Alternative Dispute
Resolution tools in enforcement of regulation also emphasizes the
need for more cooperation with industry in achieving compliance
and less stringent, punitive enforcement modes. 96 More recently, we
see programs that relax enforcement in exchange for voluntary
cooperation. The Environmental Protection Agency has
experimented with a number of such programs, with mixed
results.97 The FAA, as already mentioned, has used voluntary
reporting programs with some success. 98
C. Lack of Analytical Clarity
While consensus-based regulation and collaboration are not
capture, both promote a close relationship between the agency and
industry, and the distinction is blurry. Ayres and Braithwaite
openly say that "[t]he very conditions that foster the evolution of
93. Errol E. Meidinger, Laws and Institutions in Cross-Boundary
Stewardship, in STEWARDSHIP AcRoss BOUNDARIES 87, 101 (Richard L. Knight &
Peter B. Landres eds., 1998).
94. AIBS Co-Sponsors HCPs Study, 48 BIoScIENCE 228, 228-29 (1998);
Cameron W. Barrows et al., A Framework for Monitoring Multiple-Species
Conservation Plans, 69 J. WILDLIFE MGMT. 1333, 1343-44 (2005); Frances C.
James, Lessons Learned from a Study of Habitat Conservation Planning, 49
BIoSCIENCE 871, 873-74 (1999); Jennifer Jester, Habitat Conservation Plans
Under Section 10 of the Endangered Species Act: The Alabama Beach Mouse
and the Unfulfilled Mandate of Species Recovery, 26 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV.
131, 147-54 (1998); M. Nils Peterson et al., A Tale of Two Species: Habitat
Conservation Plans as Bounded Conflict, 68 J. WILDLIFE MGMT. 743, 743-45
(2004); Matthew E. Rahn et al., Species Coverage in Multispecies Habitat
Conservation Plans: Where's the Science?, 56 BIoSCIENCE 613, 616-19 (2006);
Wilhere, supra note 90, at 1089.
95. Leigh Raymond, Cooperation Without Trust: Overcoming Collective
Action Barriers to Endangered Species Protection, 34 POL'Y STUD. J. 37, 52-54
(2006); Craig W. Thomas, Habitat Conservation Planning: Certainly
Empowered, Somewhat Deliberative, Questionably Democratic, 29 PoL. & Soc'Y
105, 118-24 (2001).
96. Lisa Blomgren Bingham, Avoiding Negotiation: Strategy and Practice,
in THE NEGOTIATOR'S FIELDBOOK 113, 113-20 (Andrea Kupfer Schneider &
Christopher Honeyman eds., 2006); Amy J. Cohen, Negotiation, Meet New
Governance: Interests, Skills, and Selves, 33 LAw & Soc. INQuiRy 503, 534
(2008). For criticism of this development, see Jonathan D. Mester, The
Administrative Dispute Resolution Act of 1996: Will the New Era of ADR in
Federal Administrative Agencies Occur at the Expense of Public Accountability?,
13 OHIo ST. J. ON DIsP. RESOL. 167, 168-69 (1997).
97. Martina Vidovic & Neha Khanna, Can Voluntary Pollution Prevention
Programs Fulfill Their Promises? Further Evidence from the EPA's 33/50
Program, 53 J. ENvTL. ECON. & MGMT. 180, 180-82, 189-92 (2007).
98. Mills, Collaborative Regulatory Partnerships, supra note 18, at 45.
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cooperation are also the conditions that promote the evolution of
capture and indeed corruption."99 Similarly, Shover suggests that
"the establishment of cooperative relationships for the solution of
problems" is one of the factors leading to capture. 00
More negatively, an opponent of collaborative government
described collaboration as follows: "[Tihe very entities subject to
regulatory compulsion should engage in the design of rules that will
dictate their conduct, self-monitoring for compliance with those
rules, and self-enforcement when the entity discovers a violation of
those rules."' 0
Nonetheless, the terms are not supposed to be interchangeable.
What, then, are the differences between collaboration and capture?
Three things stand out. First, supporters of collaboration want
others besides industry involved. Second, collaboration envisions
equal status or the agency as the dominant partner; capture implies
the industry is the dominant partner. Third, collaboration has good
consequences; capture has bad consequences.
The first and probably clearest distinction is that most of the
pro-collaboration literature does not suggest allowing industry to be
the only voice. In fact, most of this literature wants industry to be a
part of a dialogue in which other interest groups are just as well
represented and have at least as much influence, if not more. 02
This potential "countering" role for non-business interest groups is
not a new idea, of course. It was behind some of the moves to more
participatory government in the 1960s andl970s,103 but has since
become an integral part of the pro-collaboration literature of recent
decades.
For example, Ayres and Braithwaite's influential Responsive
Regulation reserves an important role for Nongovernmental
Organizations ("NGOs") serving as equal participants in the
negotiation and enforcement of rules. 0 4
For Sabatier too, the solution to capture is participation by third
parties, either initiated by the agency or initiated by the interest
99. AYRES & BRAITHWAITE, supra note 54, at 55.
100. NEAL SHOVER ET AL., ENFORCEMENT OR NEGOTIATION: CONSTRUCTING A
REGULATORY BUREAUCRACY 5 (1986); see also BARRY M. MITNICK, THE POLITICAL
ECONOMY OF REGULATION: CREATING, DESIGNING, AND REMOVING REGULATORY
FORMS 38 (1980); SPARROW, supra note 48, at 18, 35.
101. Mark Seidenfeld, Empowering Stakeholders: Limits on Collaboration as
the Basis for Flexible Regulation, 41 WM. & MARY L. REV. 411, 412 (2000).
102. See, e.g., AYRES & BRAITHWAITE, supra note 54, at 57-60; MOSELEY,
supra note 88, at 9.
103. Reuel E. Schiller, Enlarging the Administrative Polity: Administrative
Law and the Changing Definition of Pluralism, 1945-1970, 53 VAND. L. REV.
1389, 1405-13 (2000).
104. AYRES & BRAITHWAITE, supra note 54, at 57-60.
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groups themselves.105 Other scholars have also shown positive
influence of third-party interest groups as a remedy for capture.106
As I will elaborate in Part III, my approach is pragmatic. I
believe in the art of the possible. In some cases, a third party
interest group may be a viable alternative and a good counter to
capture (or at least may have the potential to reduce the power of
the capturing industry).07 In some cases, it will be an excellent
option.108 However, it will not work in every case.109 At least in the
American context, there is reason to be skeptical about it working in
many cases.110
First, it may not always be feasible. Ayres and Braithwaite
believe a suitable NGO-defending the public interest or a relevant
private interest-will generally be available."' I am not so
sure-and not just in the case of their example of an NGO for the
Internal Revenue Service.112 In the FAA context, the pilots' union
may be seen as a potential counter to the industry on matters of
safety. However, the pilots' union's interests on the issue are mixed
since it also has an interest in increasing jobs and the profitability of
the industry, so it does not quite represent the public interest.
Further, consider the MMS. In that context, what NGO promotes
"honesty in dealing with the oil industry"? Environmental
organizations may be watchdogs for compliance with environmental
requirements, but what about the rest? For many regulatory issues,
the problem of diffused interests mentioned in the economic
105. Berry, supra note 60, at 525-26; Paul A. Sabatier et al., Hierarchical
Controls, Professional Norms, Local Constituencies, and Budget Maximization:
An Analysis of U.S. Forest Service Planning Decisions, 39 Am. J. POL. Sc. 204,
221, 226, 229 (1995); Sabatier, supra note 58, at 325-26.
106. Berry, supra note 60, at 542; William T. Gormley, Jr., Alternative
Models of the Regulatory Process: Public Utility Regulation in the States, 35 W.
POL. Q. 297, 302-05, 309-10 (1982); Shapiro & Steinzor, supra note 3, at 1742;
Guy L. F. Holburn & Pablo T. Spiller, Interest Group Representation in
Administrative Institutions: The Impact of Consumer Advocates and Elected
Commissioners on Regulatory Policy in the United States 14-16 (Univ. of Cal.
Energy Inst., Energy Policy & Econ. Working Paper No. 002, 2002).
107. Peltzman points out that capture does not mean that the regulator will
only follow the industry's wishes; if there is a competing group, it might have
some influence but less than that of the capturing group. Peltzman, supra note
65, at 9-14; Peltzman, supra note 64, at 217-19.
108. See, e.g., Sabatier et al., supra note 105, at 229-32. The authors
demonstrate that there is strong influence of community and environmental
groups, and, in some cases, an influence equal to that of business groups. Id.
109. This is because some aspects of responsive regulations may not work in
every case. See Gunningham, supra note 54, at 1-4, 10-12.
110. Sabatier, supra note 58, at 325-27. The author presents this as a
solution that is sometimes available, but certainly one that is not always
available. Id.
111. Ayres & Braithwaite, supra note 15, at 444-45.
112. Id. at 444.
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literature is all too real. 113 Furthermore, being at the negotiating
table requires resources-ven if all information the regulator has is
made available,114 the NGO will still have to invest in processing the
information and involvement-especially in more complex
regulatory areas, where there are many decisions. There may not
always be a group with the required dedication or the ability to
constantly engage. We can learn something about this from the
United States' notice and comment rulemaking process which
provides an opportunity to any interested party to participate, at
least to some degree.115 In spite of the apparently open access,
.many studies suggest that industry participates more than others in
this process. 116 The same reasons that industry captures agencies
operate here too. Industry has the most interest in the content of
regulation, and it is a long-term, substantive interest, which keeps
industry involved after other participants have left the field." 7
Industry has substantial resources to invest in affecting the content
of regulation, and strong incentives to do so.s18 In some situations,
there will be an NGO with the same dedication and the ability to
persevere; in others there will not.
Furthermore, even where such an NGO is available, it will not
necessarily solve the problem. One question is who will guard the
guardian: how do we prevent the capture of the NGO by the
regulated industry?"i9  Ayres and Braithwaite suggest as the
solution a contested representation.120 This, however, requires not
113. The argument is that, for many regulatory issues, affected members of
the public have too low of a stake in the outcome to invest sufficiently in
acquiring information and monitoring. Peltzman, supra note 64, at 212-13.
114. See Ayres and Braithwaite, supra note 15, at 472-73, 478-87.
115. CROLEY, supra note 48, at 138-39; Jeffrey S. Lubbers, The
Transformation of the U.S. Rulemaking Process-For Better or Worse, 34 OHIO
N.U. L. REV. 469, 471, 481-82 (2008); Dorit Rubinstein Reiss, Tailored
Participation: Modernizing the APA Rulemaking Procedures, 12 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS.
& PUB. POL'Y 321, 330-37 (2009).
116. See Golden, supra note 73, at 247-48, 259-61 (noting that those with
money, particularly businesses, are the most influential); Reiss, supra note 115,
at 332 (noting that it is rare for others beyond interest groups, particularly
business interest groups, to participate in rulemaking); Shapiro & Steinzor,
supra note 3, at 1752-55 (noting that "many more business groups lobby the
Executive Branch than public interest groups" (citaton omitted)); Webb Yackee
& Webb Yackee, supra note 73, at 128-30 ("[B]usiness interests dominate
bureaucratic policymaking.. . -"); William F. West, Formal Procedures,
Informal Processes, Accountability, and Responsiveness in Bureaucratic Policy
Making: An Institutional Policy Analysis, 64 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 66, 66-68 (2004)
(noting that public comment "was numerically weighted in favor of business
groups").
117. BERNSTEIN, supra note 3, at 269-71.
118. Id.; Sabatier, supra note 58, at 317-20.
119. Ayres & Braithwaite, supra note 15, at 439-40.
120. Id. at 440.
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one but multiple suitable NGOs able and willing to undertake the
role.
Similarly, if an NGO exists that is willing to counter the
influence of the capturing industry it may improve the regulatory
result--or not. It all depends on which interests it represents. Not
all clashes between private interests protect the public interest.
Just as important, "[elverything has a price."121 Allowing a third
party to counteract the influence of industry carries the cost of
added delays, and depending on the level of trust between actors,
can cause a return to a more contentious process. It thus has the
potential to thwart the original intent of the collaboration
altogether. Sometimes the price will be worth paying. Other times,
if the results of capture are good enough and the level of conflict
high enough, it will not be.
A second distinction between collaboration and capture is that
the term collaboration does not imply, as capture does, that the
dominant partner is industry. It implies a partnership of equals.
Calling a regulatory relationship capture suggests that industry
usually gets its way, often because the agency really buys into the
industry's views. 122 This is an important difference, but it seems
more a matter of degree than of kind; how much real influence does
industry have in practice? If an agency accepted industry's view,
was it captured, or was it convinced by industry's arguments?
Determining the degree of industry's influence may be difficult in
practice. And even where that is possible, the argument still stands
that mechanisms of collaboration facilitate and create opportunities
for capture.
The final difference is a difference in results. Calling a
relationship between industry and regulator collaboration implies a
positive outcome; capture implies a negative one. But evaluation
criteria based solely on results are not very useful as a conceptual
tool to identify capture or other phenomena. Results, obviously, can
only be examined in hindsight. In terms of normative judgment,
they do not help assess the behavior itself. Results do not provide a
very useful guide, especially since it's not so obvious we can identify
capture when we see it. For starters, identifying whether regulation
works for the benefit of a certain industry is not easy. In an early
study, Etzioni challenged Stigler and Friedland's early finding that
utilities had captured regulators 123 by using their original data to
arrive at the alternative conclusion-that regulation actually
121. ANNE BISHOP, DAUGHTER OF THE BLOOD 108 (1998).
122. BERNSTEIN, supra note 3, at 270-71; Ayres & Braithwaite, supra note
15, at 449; Hanson & Yosifon, supra note 47, at 214 (explaining that the second
layer of capture is where "the interior situation of relevant actors is also subject
to capture.... [T]argets include the way that people think and the way that
they think they think.").
123. Stigler & Friedland, supra note 62.
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benefited consumers and therefore the regulators were not
captured.124
Even if regulation does work for the regulated industry, it is not
at all clear that capture is at work. In an innovative piece,
Carpenter demonstrated that there are other reasons besides
capture that regulation may benefit large, established firms.125
These firms have real advantages. For example, they are more
known to the regulator, who can therefore make quicker decisions in
relation to them, may enter niches earlier that are politically
valuable, and can better withstand delays in decision making. 126
Besides the difficulty of identifying capture, given the negative
implications of the term, if used as a basis for policy prescriptions, it
is problematic to say to the agency after the fact, "at first we
thought you were collaborating and all was well, so we encouraged
you to keep at it, but now we see that, since things turned out badly,
you were in fact captured, and therefore there will be
consequences."127
Both capture and collaboration address situations of a close
relationship between agency and industry. The analytical
distinction between them is problematic, and even when it can be
used, collaboration mechanisms can be seen at least as "capture
facilitators." The question is, therefore, what are the possible
consequences of such a close relationship?
II. THE RISKS AND BENEFITS OF A CLOSE RELATIONSHIP
A. The Risks
The risks of a close relationship between agency and industry
are that it could lead to weak (or absent) protection of the public,
result in benefits to the industry at the expense of the public ("rent-
seeking"),128 and lead to straight out corruption.
One common justification for regulation is protecting the
environment, public health, or other important values against
124. Amitai Etzioni, Does Regulation Reduce Electricity Rates? A Research
Note, 19 POL'Y ScI. 349, 351-52 (1986).
125. Carpenter, supra note 75, at 614.
126. Id. at 614-15.
127. Cf. ROBERT D. BEHN, RETHINKING DEMOCRATIC ACCOUNTABILITY 3 (2001)
("Those whom we want to hold accountable have a clear understanding of what
accountability means: Accountability means punishment.. . . Moreover, the
definition of a 'screwup' is constantly changing. ... Public officials may not
realize that something is a 'screwup' until someone holds them accountable for
doing what many others have been doing for quite a while.").
128. CROLEY, supra note 48, at 28-29; Peltzman, supra note 65, at 9-10; Paul
Eric Teske et al., The Economic Theory of Regulation and Trucking
Deregulation: Shifting to the State Level, 79 PUB. CHOICE 247, 248-49 (1994).
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economic interests of private firms1 29 When it comes to protecting
other important values (such as health, safety, or the environment),
industry members naturally want to minimize their costs in order to
increase their profits; in fact, it can be argued that they have a duty
(to their shareholders) to do so. 3 0 One result of this, goes the
argument, is that industry's influence will lead to ineffective, weak,
and watered-down regulations that, in fact, do not provide adequate
protections in these areas. For example, one study suggests that,
because of industry influence, the Food Safety and Inspection
Service in the United States Department of Agriculture ("USDA")
had done nothing in relation to E. Coli-contaminated meat for over a
decade (1982-1995).131 This neglect continued in spite of repeated
outbreaks of illnesses related to E. Coli and after a report by the
National Academy of Sciences, which pointed out the shortcomings
of the USDA's method of inspection and suggested a different one.132
The situation only changed after a very widespread outbreak of E.
Coli, which was traced to contaminated meat and had dramatic and
obvious effects (including the deaths of two children).133 Even then,
the final rule was a watered-down version of the original, with most
of the effective protections removed-a result of intensive efforts by
industry. Industry wanted a weak rule, and it succeeded in getting
just that.134
Similarly, Etzioni suggests that a rule by the Department of
Transportation was "profoundly shaped" by the railroad industry.135
The Department of Transportation allowed railroads to choose the
129. See CROLEY, supra note 48, at 14; Cary Coglianese & David Lazer,
Management-Based Regulation: Prescribing Private Management to Achieve
Public Goals, 37 LAw & Soc'v. REV. 691, 696, 698, 700 (2003); Cary Coglianese
et al., Performance-Based Regulation: Prospects and Limitations in Health,
Safety, and Environmental Protection, 55 ADMIN. L. REV. 705, 706, 711-15, 723
(2003); Lars Noah, The Little Agency That Could (Act with Indifference to
Constitutional and Statutory Strictures), 93 CORNELL L. REV. 901, 901-04
(2008).
130. Robert Sprague & Aaron J. Lyttle, Shareholder Primacy and the
Business Judgment Rule: Arguments for Expanded Corporate Democracy, 16
STAN. J.L. Bus. & FIN. 1, 4-5 (2010). While still dominant in practice, that
notion is challenged in some corporate law scholarship. See, e.g., ROBERT
CHARLES CLARK, CORPORATE LAw 677-81 (1986). The author claims that
corporations have duties to society at large, not just to their shareholders, and
that those duties require corporate responsibility. Id. at 695; see also C. James
Koch, Social Responsibility, Corporate Strategy and Profits, 1 HARv. ENVTL. L.
REV. 662, 664-68 (1976); Colin Scott, Reflexive Governance, Meta-Regulation
and Corporate Social Responsibility: The 'Heineken Effect', in PERSPECTIVES ON
CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY 178-82 (Nina Boeger et al. eds., 2008).
131. Dion Casey, Agency Capture: The USDA's Struggle to Pass Food Safety
Regulations, KAN. J.L. & PUB. PoL'Y, Spring 2008, at 142, 147-48.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 153-56.
135. Etzioni, supra note 3, at 320.
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routes acceptable for dangerous cargoes based on their own
weighing of the factors involved (including the costs). 1 36 Etzioni
discusses a claim by Melberth from OMBWatch that the lobbyists
from the industry actually provided the text of the rule.137 This rule,
according to critics, failed to require rerouting of dangerous cargoes
around major cities-including those designated by the Department
of Homeland Security as targets for future terrorist attacks-with
the result that the railroads continued to route such cargoes through
population centers, potentially endangering lives. 38
Etzioni offers another example. In 2000, when the FDA
prepared to publish information about the mercury content of
various foods, the tuna industry-realizing canned tuna was going
to be classed as dangerous-lobbied the FDA.139 The FDA
recalibrated its categorization, and an FDA official, Clark
Carrington, admitted that the staffers designed the three categories
of mercury danger so that canned tuna fell into the "low" category to
"keep the market share at a reasonable level."140
Furthermore, capture can also lead to complete removal of
regulations-deregulation-a phenomenon described by Carpenter
as "corrosive capture."141
The risks of a close relationship between agency and industry
are also found in relation to enforcement. Due to the close
relationship between the regulators and the regulated companies,
the regulators will be unlikely to do their job and rigorously enforce
the regulations.142 This will lead to decreased protections for the
public. The regulators will be unwilling to penalize their good
friends in the industry. On the contrary, they may seek to please
and promote those to whom they are personally connected. After all,
Great Walls can always be brought down by great lunches; in other
words, the separation into regulated and regulator may not survive
close personal contacts. This is especially true where there is an
exchange of personnel and close interpersonal connections between
agency officials and industry employees. Indeed, much of the




139. Id. at 321.
140. Id.
141. Daniel Carpenter, Corrosive Capture? The Dueling Forces of Autonomy
and Industry Influence in FDA Pharmaceutical Regulation, in PREVENTING
CAPTURE: SPECIAL INTEREST INFLUENCE IN REGULATION, AND How To LIMIT IT,
supra note 46 (manuscript at 3-5).
142. PETER GRABOSKY & JOHN BRAITHWAITE, OF MANNERS GENTLE:
ENFORCEMENT STRATEGIES OF AUSTRALIAN BUSINESS REGULATORY AGENCIES 198-
201, 203-07 (1987); CHRISTOPHER D. STONE, WHERE THE LAW ENDS: THE SOCIAL
CONTROL OF CORPORATE BEHAVIOR 93-110 (1st ed. 1975); TURNER, supra note 8,
at 17-18, 37-45; Etzioni, supra note 3, at 320.
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the "revolving door"-people moving between industry and the
regulators. 143 This tendency was described by the Department of
the Interior's Acting Inspector General, Mary L. Kendall, as part of
the reason for the ethical problems discovered in the MMS, where
there was "a culture where the acceptance of gifts from oil and gas
companies were [sic] widespread throughout that office."144
Of greatest concern to me is the environment in which these
inspectors operate-particularly the ease with which they
move between industry and government. ... [W]e discovered
that the individuals involved in the fraternizing and gift
exchange-both government and industry-have often known
one another since childhood. Their relationships were formed
well before they took their jobs with industry or
government. 145
Even without corruption, close connections can foster excessive
trust that will lead to accepting the words of the industry at face
value and, therefore, not finding out about violations. For example,
in relation to the FAA, a report by the Nader group found that FAA
inspectors often missed industry violations because they relied on
paperwork provided by the industry to discover problems, and the
industry would lie in writing-a practice termed "pencil
whipping."146
In another example, the Bureau of Land Management ("BLM),
the agency handling on-shore oil drilling, was found by the GAO to
regularly approve drilling permits without an Environmental
Impact Statement, relying on exclusions provided in section 390 of
the Energy Policy Act.147 The GAO found that the MMS (acting
under the aegis of the BLM) used such exclusions in more than a
quarter of drilling permits between 2006 and 2008,148 frequently
143. SPARROW, supra note 48, at 35; Dal B6, supra note 48, at 214-15, 217-
18. But for a more positive view of the revolving door, see Ayres & Braithwaite,
supra note 15, at 436-37.
144. Memorandum from John E. Dupuy, Assistant Inspector Gen. for
Investigations, to S. Elizabeth Birnbaum, Dir., Minerals Mgmt. Serv. (Apr. 12,
2010) (on file with the author).
145. Memorandum from Mary L. Kendall, Acting Inspector Gen., to Ken
Salazar, Sec. of the Interior (May 24, 2010) (on file with the author). But see
generally Carrigan, supra note 46 (suggesting a different, historical explanation
from Kendall's assessment of the problem and its source).
146. NADER & SMITH, supra note 11, at 99-101.
147. 42 U.S.C. § 15942 (2006).
148. U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-09-872, ENERGY POLICY ACT OF
2005: GREATER CLARITY NEEDED To ADDRESS CONCERNS WITH CATEGORICAL
ExcLusIoNs FOR OIL AND GAS DEVELOPMENT UNDER SECTION 390 OF THE ACT 12
(Sept. 2009), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d09872.pdf.
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"out of compliance with both the law and BLM's implementing
guidance."149
Preparing an Environmental Impact Statement, as required by
the National Environmental Policy Act ("NEPA"),150 is costly and
difficult, and removing the requirement is a break for industry, but
it raises concerns about adequately identifying environmental
consequences and thus environmental protection. In a specific
example, the MMS (at the time under the BLM) apparently granted
an exclusion from the NEPA to BP's drilling in the Gulf of Mexico-
drilling that ended with a catastrophic, far-reaching oil spill.151 The
natural accusation is that cozy relationships between the agency
and the company led to lax enforcement of the legal requirements,
sacrificing the environment to the company's interest. According to
a member of an environmental group quoted in the article, "[t]he
agency's oversight role has devolved to little more than rubber-
stamping British Petroleum's self-serving drilling plans."15 2
Another common justification for tight regulation is that it can
correct market failures (e.g., by limiting monopolies and cartels). 153
The situation here is somewhat different. In a monopoly situation,
industry will want to place barriers on new entrants to the market
and make access difficult.154 For example, one of the common
struggles in relation to telecommunications liberalization is to allow
potential new entrants access to the existing network to prevent
them from having to invest the tremendous costs of creating a
network anew.155 Research found that opening the market to
competition required regulation to prevent the incumbent from
setting access prices too high, and thus abusing their market
149. Id. at 23-29. Note that the GAO did not attribute these deviations to
wrongdoing: "We did not find intentional actions on the part of BLM staff to
circumvent the law; rather, our findings reflect what appear to be honest
mistakes stemming from confusion in implementing a new law with evolving
guidance." Id. at 29; see also Juliet Eilperin, U.S. Exempted BP Rigs from
Impact Analysis, WASH. POsT, May 5, 2010, at A4.
150. 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (2006).
151. Eilperin, supra note 149.
152. Id. (quoting KierAn Suckling, Exec. Dir., Ctr. for Biological Diversity).
153. HAINES, supra note 68, at 50-52, 203; David Levi-Faur, Regulatory
Capitalism: The Dynamics of Change Beyond Telecoms and Electricity, 19
GOVERNANCE 497, 503-04 (2006).
154. See Carpenter, supra note 75, at 613 (focusing on the entry-barrier
aspect of capture).
155. Damien Geradin, The Opening of State Monopolies to Competition:
Main Issues of the Liberalization Process, in THE LIBERALIZATION OF STATE
MONOPOLIES IN THE EUROPEAN UNION AND BEYOND 181, 182-84 (Damien Geradin
ed., 2000); Pierre Larouche, Telecommunications, in THE LIBERALIZATION OF
STATE MONOPOLIES IN THE EUROPEAN UNION AND BEYOND, supra, at 15, 44-45;
Michael J. Legg, Verizon Communications, Inc. v. FCC-Telecommunications
Access Pricing and Regulator Accountability Through Administrative Law and
Takings Jurisprudence, 56 FED. Comm. L.J. 563, 565-67, 575 (2004).
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power.156  Close connections between the incumbent and the
regulator can lead to setting the access prices high. 157
When it comes to rate setting, established industry will want a
lax regime that provides it with maximum freedom. For example, in
his study of railway prices, Huntington demonstrated that, since the
late 1920s, the ICC, captured by railroads, consented to any rate
increase the railroad wanted.158
B. The Benefits
While the risks of a close relationship are real enough, industry
involvement in writing regulations is a recurring phenomenon, 15 9 as
is flexible (or lax) enforcement. Many studies have found that
regulators rarely act punitively and generally prefer to negotiate
and work with industry rather than prosecute or punish it.160 And
that is not just because of the problems of the administrative state;
there are good reasons to want industry involvement in the creation
and enforcement of regulation, in spite of the obvious risks.
The first is that the best information about what is going on in
industry is found in the hands of industry. The second is that
working with industry can lead to better results; enforcing
compliance, without cooperation, is costly and, at best, only partly
efficient-because, among other things, an industry unwilling to
cooperate can find many ways to obstruct or avoid enforcement. 161
The third is that it can also lead to better results because there is a
societal advantage in preventing unanticipated negative
consequences for industry, 162 and industry is often in the best
position to anticipate and warn against such consequences.
156. STEVEN K. VOGEL, FREER MARKETS, MORE RULES: REGULATORY REFORM
IN ADVANCED INDUSTRIAL COUNTRIES 65-66, 88-92 (1996); Viktor Mayer-
Schonberger & Mathias Strasser, A Closer Look at Telecom Deregulation: The
European Advantage, 12 HARv. J.L. & TECH. 561, 564-66 (1999); Vincent
Wright, Public Administration, Regulation, Deregulation and Reregulation, in
MANAGING PUBLIC ORGANIZATIONS: LESSONS FROM CONTEMPORARY EUROPEAN
EXPERIENCE 244, 245 (Kjell A. Eliassen & Jan Kooiman eds., 1993).
157. In telecommunications, see the articles described in Dal B6, supra note
48, at 216. Beyond utilities, the railroads' capture of the ICC led to increased
fares. See Samuel P. Huntington, The Marasmus of the ICC: The Commission,
the Railroads, and the Public Interest, 61 YALE L.J. 467, 478, 480-81 (1952);
Teske et al., supra note 128, at 249.
158. Huntington, supra note 157, at 481-85.
159. See supra note 66.
160. GRABoSKY & BRAITHWAITE, supra note 142, at 190-95; KEITH HAWKINS,
ENVIRONMENT AND ENFORCEMENT: REGULATION AND THE SOCIAL DEFINITION OF
POLLUTION 7 (1984); Ayres & Braithwaite, supra note 15, at 457-58 n.54;
Seidenfeld, supra note 101, at 419, 424-25; Gunningham, supra note 54, at 4-8.
161. HAINES, supra note 68, at 24-26.
162. Ayres & Braithwaite, supra note 15, at 453 (noting that the regulated
firm is also a member of society, and increasing its welfare should count in
calculating the effects to the general welfare).
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1. Industry and the Information Advantage
Good regulation requires good information. Not only is this self-
evident, but the legal framework is designed to increase the
information available to agencies. 163 At least one goal of the notice
and comment process the Administrative Procedure Act ("APA")
mandates for informal rulemaking is to provide information. 164
Many of the other requirements added to the process require the
agency to undertake research that will make its decision more
informed.165
A serious problem with this process is the fact that often the
best information about what is going on in a given industry is in the
hands of members of that industry. Agencies are regularly
understaffed and overworked 16 6-a reality that is getting worse in
these days of budget deficits and in this "age of austerity"167 when
agency resources are constrained and reduced.168 They cannot, even
with the best will, collect all the needed information about industry
to either devise the best regulations or catch those who violate them.
For example, the FAA is, on its face, a large agency with over 50,000
employees.169  But many of these employees are air traffic
controllers.170 There are only about 4000 inspectors overseeing all
the planes in the United States.171 As a second example, the Food
Safety and Inspection Service of the USDA has to oversee the safety
of meat and poultry in the United States. The growth in meat
consumption and sale has left its inspectors overburdened; one
163. For a description of the APA framework and its goals, see Reiss, supra
note 115, at 326; Reuel E. Schiller, Rulemaking's Promise: Administrative Law
and Legal Culture in the 1960s and 1970s, 53 ADMIN. L. REv. 1139, 1140, 1145,
1162-63 (2001); Stewart, supra note 47, at 1713-14. A thorough discussion of
the APA is beyond this paper.
164. 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2006); see also Mathew D. McCubbins et al.,
Administrative Procedures as Instruments of Political Control, 3 J.L. ECON. &
ORG. 243, 258 (1987); Richard B. Stewart, Administrative Law in the Twenty-
First Century, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 437, 446-49 (2003); West, supra note 116, at
67.
165. Lubbers, supra note 115, at 476-78.
166. SPARROW, supra note 48, at 35; Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Judicial Review of
Agency Actions in a Period of Diminishing Agency Resources, 49 ADMIN. L. REV.
61, 62-64 (1997); see also CROLEY, supra note 48, at 17.
167. Paul Pierson, From Expansion to Austerity: The New Politics of Taxing
and Spending, in SEEKING THE CENTER: POLITICS AND POLICYMAKING AT THE NEW
CENTURY 54, 60-61, 73 (Martin A. Levin et al. eds., 2001). The author uses the
term "fiscal austerity" to discuss the possible retrenchment of the welfare state
due to economic troubles of the twentieth century. Id. at 55. The term,
however, also nicely reflects the current reality of financial crises and the need
to tighten government spending-a reality felt at least for several decades.
168. Shapiro & Steinzor, supra note 3, at 1758-62.
169. ROGER W. COBB & DAVID M. PRIMO, THE PLANE TRUTH: AIRLINE
CRASHES, THE MEDIA, AND TRANSPORTATION POLICY 16 (2003).
170. MILLS, supra note 13, at 12.
171. Id.
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author estimates that "[a]t ninety-one birds per minute, inspectors
have to examine over 12,000 poultry carcasses each day. It is
estimated that inspectors have an average of just two seconds to
inspect a poultry carcass and twenty to thirty seconds to examine a
2,000 to 3,000 pound beef carcass."172 A similar claim has been
made concerning FDA resources. 173
It is easy to claim that the solution should be for Congress to
provide more funding,174 but the chances of that happening are not
very high in a political climate that calls for reducing government
size and limiting spending. 175
Along the same lines, producing information costs money. And
in an era of budget cuts, the agency often has to choose between
producing the information and doing other things. On the other
hand, industry often needs the information in question for other
purposes (e.g., information on safety problems in airplanes) and may
be collecting it anyway. Getting the information from industry can
save money. But to whom will industry be more likely to provide
the information: the cop who monitors it and is prepared to punish it
or the friendly regulator who goes out to lunch with it?
Most importantly, even if an agency had all the personnel and
funding it could wish for, its information would still be secondhand
(or we might say thirdhand since the information inspectors collect
still needs to go up the agency hierarchy and be processed before it
reaches central decision makers).176 It is the industry people who
work on the ground and know what is really happening. 177 They
have the best opportunities to spot problems, and they can be the
172. Casey, supra note 131, at 146.
173. David C. Viadeck, The FDA and Deference Lost: A Self-Inflicted Wound
or the Product of a Wounded Agency? A Response to Professor O'Reilly, 93
CORNELL L. REV. 981, 983-84 (2008); Lorna Zach & Vicki Bier, Risk-Based
Regulation for Import Safety, in IMPORT SAFETY: REGULATORY GOVERNANCE IN
THE GLOBAL EcONOMY 151, 153-54 (Cary Coglianese et al. eds., 2009).
174. See Thomas 0. Sargentich, The Critique of Active Judicial Review of
Administrative Agencies: A Reevaluation, 49 ADMIN. L. REV. 599, 602-03 (1997);
David Schoenbrod, The EPA's Faustian Bargain, REGULATION, Fall 2006, at 36,
41-42; Vladeck, supra note 173, at 984-85 (arguing that, until Congress
provides the FDA with adequate funding to protect public health, the agency
will be unable to ameliorate its reputation).
175. Pierce, supra note 166, at 62-65.
176. See Sabatier et al., supra note 105, at 207 ("Given that information is
costly to acquire and that individuals have limited information-processing
capabilities, information must be condensed as it moves up the hierarchy. Such
condensation provides an opportunity for distortion, usually to flatter the
officials involved and to mirror their policy views. As a result, top officials may
hold incomplete, and often biased views of the situations confronted by their
subordinates.").
177. Alexander S. P. Pfaff & Chris William Sanchirico, Environmental Self-
Auditing: Setting the Proper Incentives for Discovery and Correction of
Environmental Harm, 16 J.L. EcoN. & ORG. 189, 189-91 (2000).
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first line of defense.17a The problem, of course, is that industry
members will have no incentive to provide information that might
later hurt them. They will have even less incentive to provide such
information in an adversarial, punitive, hostile environment.179 If
the relationship with the agency is good, and especially if industry
members believe regulators care about industry's interests, industry
will have more incentive to provide information and will be more
willing to trust the agency with it and to try and convince the
agency in noncontentious ways of its point of view.180
Of course, another solution to the "not having good enough
information" problem is requiring industry to provide such
information and heavily punishing any parties that withhold it.
However, that may backfire. Industry can respond by providing too
much information.81 Information, even when provided, needs to be
processed and considered. In fact, one of the most common problems
in the modern world is the problem of "info glut"-having too much
information.182 Sorting through information also requires resources;
extracting nuggets of meaning from a mass of verbal gravel can be
very labor intensive when information is not well presented. 183
Close relationships can reduce the motivation to practice this sort of
information dumping and can incentivize industry to provide the
information in a more useable form.184
Information overload is not the only potential risk of coercive or
punitive information gathering. As with any other issue, achieving
compliance through coercion is neither simple nor straightforward.
Getting the information voluntarily through cooperation is often
178. MILLS, supra note 13, at 14; Anna Alberini & Kathleen Segerson,
Assessing Voluntary Programs to Improve Environmental Quality, 22 ENVTL. &
RESOURCE ECON. 157, 158 (2002).
179. Edward P. Weber & Anne M. Khademian, Wicked Problems, Knowledge
Challenges, and Collaborative Capacity Builders in Network Settings, 68 PUB.
ADMIN. REV. 334, 343 (2008) ("[U]sing only government-based public managers
and coercion to solicit information and bring about compliance may lead to
short-term, incomplete, high-cost successes at the expense of long-term
problem-solving effectiveness.. . .").
180. Dal B6, supra note 48, at 214.
181. Wagner, supra note 3, at 1331.
182. DAVID SHENK, DATA SMOG: SURVIVING THE INFORMATION GLUT 15-16
(1997); Wagner, supra note 3, at 1331.
183. ARCHON FUNG ET AL., FULL DISCLOSURE: THE PERILS AND PROMISE OF
TRANSPARENCY 171-72 (2007); SHENK, supra note 182; Ira S. Nathenson,
Internet Infoglut and Invisible Ink: Spamdexing Search Engines with Meta
Tags, 12 HARv. J.L. & TECH. 43, 51-53 (1998).
184. Alberini & Segerson, supra note 178 ("[I]ncreased cooperation between
polluters and regulators can improve information flows and reduce
implementation lags."). On the importance of the format in which the
information is presented (easy versus hard to digest), see FUNG ET AL., supra
note 183, at 57-64.
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more efficient and easier.185  There is at least one study that
suggests it may incentivize industry to conduct more research.186
If industry has a direct involvement in writing regulations, the
regulation may be self-serving and weaker than it might otherwise
be, but it will probably be well informed. That will help prevent
ineffective or erroneous regulation that may have substantial
unintended consequences.
At the same time, relying on the regulated industry for
information raises at least two real problems. First, industry will
probably provide information that supports its interests, place
emphasis on things that support its views, or tend to downplay the
things it prefers not to have regulated. Industry may even do that
without intending to; a known cognitive bias is the confirmation
bias, which suggests that people (or companies) tend to emphasize
and be more receptive to things that support their initial point of
view. 87 Almost automatically, the tendency will be to downplay or
ignore adverse information-to rationalize it away.188 This is not
true just of industry. Sabatier pointed to the tendency of advocacy
coalitions to "resist" information that suggests their core beliefs are
wrong or their preferred outcomes unattainable, and to embrace
information that supports their preferred point of view. 189 Thus,
simply by the nature of things, industry will tend to believe in, and
provide, information that represents its interest in the best
available light. Close connections do not reduce the risk of self-
serving information-but neither does the absence of such
connections. And the absence of information from industry can
sometimes be much more costly than the receipt of self-serving
information, as in the example of the FAA's voluntary disclosure
programs.
Another danger is that industry will lie.190 One could argue
that a close relationship might increase the risk of lying because the
185. Mary F. Evans et al., Regulation with Direct Benefits of Information
Disclosure and Imperfect Monitoring, 57 J. ENVTL. EcoN. & MGMT. 284, 285-86
(2009).
186. A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, Mandatory Versus Voluntary
Disclosure of Product Risks 4 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper
No. 12776, 2006), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/wl2776.pdf
("[Voluntary disclosure will induce firms to acquire more information about
product risks because they can keep silent if the information is unfavorable.").
187. MAX H. BAZERMAN, JUDGMENT IN MANAGERIAL DECISION MAKING 34-35
(5th ed. 2002).
188. Id.
189. Paul A. Sabatier, An Advocacy Coalition Framework of Policy Change
and the Role of Policy-Oriented Learning Therein, 21 POL'Y ScI. 129, 133 (1988);
see also William D. Leach & Paul A. Sabatier, To Trust an Adversary:
Integrating Rational and Psychological Models of Collaborative Policymaking,
99 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 491, 494 (2005).
190. Frid~ric Boehm, Regulatory Capture Revisited - Lessons from
Economics of Corruption 11, 16 (Internet Ctr. for Corruption Research, Working
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industry will expect the agency to believe it and therefore expect the
chances of getting caught to go down. But the risk of lying exists
regardless of the relationship with the agency. One could equally
argue to the contrary-that the industry will be more likely to lie
(and will be more inclined to feel that lies are justified) if the
government is "the enemy"191 than if the relationship is good, and
especially if industry expects the regulator to have a realistic regard
for its legitimate interests.
A more subtle, but just as real, danger involved in capture is the
effect of trust on the testing of information. The problem here is
that if the agency and industry have close connections, the agency
may see information provided by its good friends in industry as
reliable and not make adequate efforts to confirm or verify it.
Mistakes can happen even with a completely transparent,
cooperative, and honest industry, and thus verifying information is
useful and important. In fact, for anything but perfection, it is
crucial. For example, the "pencil whipping" described by Nader and
Smith can be traced in part to the FAA's trust that the airlines
provided reliable information, when they clearly did not.192
Similarly, another Nader report-this time on the FDA-suggests
that, in relation to food additives, the FDA bought into industry
assumptions and accepted some self-serving and misleading
research results without doing its own testing.193 On the other
hand, this kind of thing is not limited to close regulatory
relationships. Even an agency that is not "captured" will have
trouble carefully scrutinizing data provided by industry. Staffing
problems and lack of inside information means agencies do not-
cannot-test most of the information they get from industry.
Instead, they often rely on self-reporting. A close relationship can
improve the quality of self-reporting since relationships work both
ways; the industry, too, will not want to disappoint its regulator
allies or jeopardize the connection.
At the end, it comes down to a question of which problem one
would rather face. Is it better to have more information, at the risk
of that information being self-serving or even unreliable, or is it
better to lack information and make mistakes because of that? If
regulation is the art of the possible, lack of information makes very
little possible. The information provided by industry may well be
Paper No. 22, 2007), available at http://www.icgg.org/downloads/Boehm%20-
%20Regulatory%2OCapture%2ORevisited.pdf. Lying is also what the Nader
report accuses the airlines of doing to the FAA. See NADER & SMITH, supra note
11, at 99-101.
191. BARDACH & KAGAN, supra note 12, at 210-13 (noting the "regulatory
ratchet" limitation on flexible regulatory enforcement and the persistence of
unreasonableness).
192. NADER & SMITH, supra note 11, at 99-101.
193. TURNER, supra note 8, at 99-106.
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partial and self-serving, but it is more than the agency will have in a
more conflictual scenario.
2. Improving Regulatory Results: Compliance
A close relationship-up to the level of capture-can also
improve regulatory results by improving compliance. Thoughtful
students of regulation demonstrated that beyond a certain point,
strict enforcement can backfire and lead to less, not more,
compliance. 194 The reason is that it can create resentment, which
will lead to resistance and passive compliance. 195 That is not to say
that having strict sanctions is not useful, but it is useful most of all
as a tool of last resort and as a background for strategies of
negotiation and cooperation. 196
Many studies have demonstrated the limits and problems of
coercive enforcement. A scholar of regulation recently said:
Research on second-generation regulatory agencies made clear
to many that there are inherent shortcomings and limitations
of strict rule-based enforcement. Investigators from Australia
to the U.S. found that despite the content of regulations,
oversight of business firms was exceedingly imperfect. . . . It
was obvious to a host of investigators that a rigorous
deterrence-based approach to oversight of privileged offenders
194. GRABOSKY & BRAITHWAITE, supra note 142, at 190-91, 198-201; Roberto
Pires, Promoting Sustainable Compliance: Styles of Labour Inspection and
Compliance Outcomes in Brazil, 147 INT'L LABOUR REV. 199, 200-02 (2008);
John T. Scholz, Cooperation, Deterrence, and the Ecology of Regulatory
Enforcement, 18 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 179, 179-80, 185-87 (1984) [hereinafter
Scholz, Cooperation]; Jodi L. Short & Michael W. Toffel, Making Self-Regulation
More Than Merely Symbolic: The Critical Role of the Legal Environment, 55
ADMIN. Sci. Q. 361, 366-69 (2010). But see generally John T. Scholz & Wayne B.
Gray, Can Government Facilitate Cooperation? An Informational Model of
OSHA Enforcement, 41 AM. J. POL. Sci. 693 (1997) (emphasizing the importance
of sanctions and supporting the view that they make a difference); John T.
Scholz & Wayne B. Gray, OSHA Enforcement and Workplace Injuries: A
Behavioral Approach to Risk Assessment, 3 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 283 (1990)
(emphasizing the importance of penalizing those who do not comply and
supporting the view that penalties make a difference).
195. Short & Toffel, supra note 194, at 368.
196. JOSEPH V. REES, REFORMING THE WORKPLACE: A STUDY OF SELF-
REGULATION IN OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY 12-13 (Keith Hawkins & John M.
Thomas eds., 1988); Short & Toffel, supra note 194, at 368-69. This mirrors the
famous "bargaining in the shadow of the law" insight. See Malcolm Feeley,
Coercion and Compliance: A New Look at an Old Problem, in COMPLIANCE AND
THE LAW: A MULTI-DISCIPLINARY APPROACH 51, 60-62 (Samuel Krislov et al. eds.,
1972); Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of
the Law: The Case of Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950, 950-51 (1979).
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that the level of political and fiscal resources it would require
may [sic] it unlikely if not impossible.197
Studies suggest that many agencies do not use punitive
sanctions even when they are available. 198 And if they do use
punitive sanctions regularly, the costs-not just the direct costs, but
the negative effects-can be very high.199
Voluntary compliance is, by many standards, better than
punitive enforcement. It is cheaper-the agency does not have to
invest as much in monitoring and in prosecuting wrongdoers. 200
Punitive actions have costs in terms of personnel and time. In the
United States, many actions against wrongdoers also involve the
courts,2 0 1 which is another consideration. Litigation is expensive. 202
Even more importantly, quite often to achieve the regulatory
results, you need the regulated firms to be willing to make an effort
and occasionally suggest creative solutions.203 Even if it is not
strictly necessary, industry creative involvement can lead to more
efficient solutions.204 An adversarial relationship will discourage
such behavior while a positive one will promote it. Not to mention
that punitive enforcement requires appropriate rules to be specified
in advance-and in complex modern realities, regulations are almost
197. Neal Shover, The Season of Responsive Regulation 7, 10-11 (June 3,
2011) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the author). For a discussion of
the literature on the issue and many more citations, see id. at 6-13.
198. GRABOSKY & BRAITHWAITE, supra note 142, at 190-91, 203; Pires, supra
note 194, at 200.
199. BARDACH & KAGAN, supra note 12, at 292-97; KAGAN, ADVERSARIAL
LEGALISM, supra note 12, at 198, 200-04; Robert A. Kagan, The Consequences of
Adversarial Legalism, in REGULATORY ENCOUNTERS: MULTINATIONAL
CORPORATIONS AND AMERICAN ADVERSARIAL LEGALISM 372, 373-74, 389-94, 400-
05 (Robert A. Kagan & Lee Axelrad eds., 2000) [hereinafter Kagan,
Consequences of Adversarial Legalism]; Pires, supra note 194; Weber &
Khademian, supra note 179.
200. Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Optimal Law Enforcement with Self-
Reporting of Behavior, 102 J. POL. EcoN. 583, 583-85 (1994); Michael W. Toffel
& Jodi L. Short, Coming Clean and Cleaning Up: Does Voluntary Self-Reporting
Indicate Effective Self-Policing?, 54 J.L. & EcoN. 609, 618 (2011).
201. For example, many enforcement actions by the EPA involve litigation.
See 42 U.S.C. §§ 7413, 9607 (2006); see also R. SHEP MELNICK, REGULATION AND
THE COURTS: THE CASE OF THE CLEAN AIR ACT 200-02 (1983); Lynn Peterson,
Promise of Mediated Settlements of Environmental Disputes: The Experience of
EPA Region V, 17 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 327, 327-30 (1992).
202. KAGAN, ADVERSARIAL LEGALISM, supra note 12, at 29-32; JAMES Q.
WILSON, BUREAUCRACY: WHAT GOVERNMENT AGENCIES DO AND WHY THEY Do IT
282-84 (1989).
203. Kagan, Consequences of Adversarial Legalism, supra note 199, at 380-
81; Robert A. Kagan et al., Explaining Corporate Environmental Performance:
How Does Regulation Matter?, 37 LAw & Soc'Y REV. 51, 51-53, 82-84 (2003).
204. Scholz, Cooperation, supra note 194, at 204, 208.
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always going to be over or under inclusive. Cooperation by industry
with the goal of the regulation can achieve better results. 2 0 5
The side effects are less negative with voluntary compliance
than with strict punitive enforcement. Bardach and Kagan
demonstrated the pitfalls of strict punitive enforcement: creating
resentment on the part of the regulated, which see enforcement as
arbitrary;206 leading the regulated companies, even the "good
apples" among them, to just do what the regulator demands and not
invest in additional responsible behavior;207 undermining
cooperative problem solving;208 and possibly leading the regulated
industry to give up on the rule of law.2 0 9 Many subsequent studies
suggested that punitive enforcement can harm cooperation. 210
Close relations between industry and regulator-and influence
of industry on the regulator's view of sanctions-certainly reduce
aggressive enforcement or even enforcement in general. 211 But they
can also increase voluntary compliance-at a price, and with an
attendant risk. If industry is involved in writing the regulations, it
presumably agrees to the content and can be expected to comply
with that content. If enforcement is flexible and negotiated with the
regulated industry-if it is done by agreement instead of by fiat-it
is more likely the agreed-upon modifications will be put in place.
The price is sacrificing some of the results that could be
achieved by top-down regulation. If industry is going to agree to a
regulatory scheme limiting it or imposing costs on it, it will probably
agree to less than the supporters of the regulation want, to what can
be seen as watered-down regulation. In some circumstances, the
regulation may be watered down to such a degree that the result
will be the sacrifice of the other values. But it does not have to be.
Industry has other reasons for not going too far in weakening
regulation. Among other things is the concern of reaction. If
regulation is too weak, there may be a public backlash, at least if
there is a bad result. The harsh reaction to the perceived cozy
relationships between FAA and Southwest described in Part I is one
example; the pressure led the FAA to substantially increase its
205. Id. at 180-81.
206. BARDACH & KAGAN, supra note 12, at 104-07.
207. Id. at 64-66, 107-09. This effect is termed "minimal compliance" by the
authors. Id. at 107-09.
208. Id. at 109-11.
209. Id. at 112-16.
210. Edward L. Deci et al., A Meta-Analytic Review of Experiments
Examining the Effects of Extrinsic Rewards on Intrinsic Motivation, 125
PSYCHOL. BULL. 627, 627-28, 658-59 (1999); Deepak Malhotra & J. Keith
Murnighan, The Effects of Contracts on Interpersonal Trust, 47 ADMIN. SCI. Q.
534, 534-35 (2002); Scholz, Cooperation, supra note 194, at 179-80; Short &
Toffel, supra note 194, at 367-69.
211. GRABOSKY & BRAITHWAITE, supra note 142, at 203; HAWKINS, supra note
160, at 3-6, 182-88; Makkai & Braithwaite, supra note 1, at 77.
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enforcement, possibly too much. In the following days, it grounded
large numbers of American Airlines planes too, disrupting travel.212
Concerns about regulation have been a reason for industry to self-
regulate.213 The same logic can lead industry to support a higher
level of regulation than it would absent any outside pressures:
better to have a hand in the process and cooperate (and be seen to
cooperate) than to have the regulations imposed.
Furthermore, in many circumstances, industry will be at least
partly on board with the goal of regulation. In terms of the FAA,
quite a bit of support for voluntary reporting programs came from
the pilots working for the allegedly capturing airlines. 214 Obviously,
safety is also a major interest of the pilots and staff on the planes,
who have constant exposure to whatever hazards exist. A similar
point is true for nuclear plants: a nuclear explosion endangers not
only the public but also everyone in the plant, and makes it harder
to get a permit to build another plant or fix things, when needed. 215
And after all, industry is not one skin; top management may have
an interest in avoiding scandals-be they airplane crashes, fatalities
because of negligently manufactured drugs (such as when Chinese
manufacturers deliberately used a cheap substitute instead of dried
pig intestines to make the drug Heparin, leading to eighty-one
deaths),216 or nuclear explosions.
Other studies suggest that at least some corporations can have
real commitment to social values, such as the environment. That is
one justification for voluntary compliance programs, some of which
focus on "high performers." 217 From the point of view of the more
socially conscious companies (the "knights," drawing on Le Grand's
terminology),218 the absence of regulation may disadvantage them
since it allows less conscientious companies to cut corners and thus
produce products more cheaply. Those companies may have an
interest in pushing for stricter regulation.219
212. MILLS, supra note 13, at 24.
213. HAUFLER, supra note 87, at 3-4; Gunningham & Rees, supra note 87, at
401-02.
214. MILLS, supra note 13, at 25.
215. CASS R. SUNSTEIN, RISK AND REASON: SAFETY, LAW, AND THE
ENVIRONMENT 144 (2002); Elizabeth Heger Boyle, Political Frames and Legal
Activity: The Case of Nuclear Power in Four Countries, 32 LAW & Soc'Y REV.
141, 155 (1998).
216. Alicia Mundy, Generic Drug Makers Line Up Behind Proposal for FDA
Fees, WALL ST. J., Feb. 16, 2011, at B1.
217. Alberini & Segerson, supra note 178, at 157-58; Vidovic & Khanna,
supra note 97, at 182.
218. Julian Le Grand, Knights, Knaves or Pawns? Human Behaviour and
Social Policy, 26 J. Soc. POL'Y 149, 149, 154 (1997).
219. GRABOSKY & BRAITHWAITE, supra note 142, at 183-84; Gunningham,
supra note 54, at 10-11.
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Not only might the sacrifice be less than anticipated; there is,
again, a question of "the art of the possible." Sometimes it is better
to compromise on the content of the policy and end up with a policy
that is easier to implement and more workable in practice than have
a stronger policy that does not work. And as long as the goal of
regulation is to achieve results and not just punish industry for
being industry or for being big industry, a compromise that achieves
something may not only be the best possible solution under the
circumstances, but it is itself a positive thing. After all, strict
enforcement or more adversarial mechanisms do not usually achieve
one hundred percent compliance either.220
3. Capture and Regulatory Results: Unintended Consequences
Regulation is not often planned with the intent to harm an
industry.221 For example, in spite of views to the contrary, the goal
of most environmental regulation is not to destroy any branch of
industry or put workers out of jobs. It is to protect the environment.
Unfortunately, sometimes the precautions needed to protect the
environment, public health, competition, or any of the other things
regulation tries to achieve are costly. They can be costly in terms of
direct monetary costs to the industry,222 or in terms of reducing
industry's competitive edge compared to industry in other
countries.223 They can be costly in other ways; for example, they can
work to the advantage of large companies and against small
businesses, thus pushing a sector towards oligopoly. 2 2 4 They can
have costs in unanticipated directions, such as delay on large
construction projects.225
220. See KAGAN, ADVERSARIAL LEGALISM, supra note 12, at 191-94. Kagan
demonstrates, citing extensive literature, that strict enforcement and
adversarial approaches in the United States did not produce better regulatory
results than in other countries and very likely resulted in the expenditure of
more time and money to achieve essentially equivalent results. Id. at 194-95,
198-205.
221. Initially, this sentence read: "Nobody plans regulation with the intent
to harm industry." But my colleague, John Leshy, pointed out that statement's
inaccuracy. For example, he suggests, some mining regulation actually serves
to restrict, and even undermine, mining operations.
222. BARDACH & KAGAN, supra note 12, at 313-15; CLYDE WAYNE CREWS, JR.,
TEN THOUSAND COMMANDMENTS: AN ANNUAL SNAPSHOT OF THE FEDERAL
REGULATORY STATE 1-2 (2008); Winston Harrington, Grading Estimates of the
Benefits and Costs of Federal Regulation 1-4 (Res. for the Future, Discussion
Paper No. 06-39, 2006), available at http://ssrn.com/paper-937357.
223. Geoffrey Garrett, Shrinking States? Globalization and National
Autonomy in the OECD, 26 OXFORD DEV. STUDIES 71, 95-96 (1998).
224. GRABOSKY & BRAITHWAITE, supra note 142, at 215-17; CosMo GRAHAM,
REGULATING PUBLIC UTILITIES: A CONSTITUTIONAL APPROACH 153-54 (2000).
225. For a telling example, see Kagan's description of the Oakland Port
dredging and the effects the regulatory framework had on it. KAGAN,
ADVERSARIAL LEGALISM, supra note 12, at 25-29.
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Strong involvement of industry in creating the regulation and
allowing it substantial influence on the way regulation is enforced
takes seriously concerns about negative effects on industry. When
designing regulation, industry can warn agencies in advance of
potential costs and work with them to mitigate such costs. Industry
can negotiate enforcement that will not lead to unintended
consequences.
At the same time, two risks are attendant. The first is that,
while capture allows us to take seriously the risks to industry from a
certain kind of regulation, it may not give the same weight to
unintended consequences for other groups, such as low-income
people or small business. The second is that capture may take such
account of the risks to industry that the attendant regulation will
not protect other important values-they will have no "bite."
Again, the challenge is one of achieving maximum results with
minimum sacrifice.
III. DISCUSSION: FACTORS AFFECTING THE RESULTS OF CAPTURE
Part II suggests that a close relationship between industry and
regulator-up to the level of capture-carries risks and can result in
very bad consequences, but also has important potential benefits. In
fact, some degree of close relationship may be necessary for a
functional relationship between regulator and regulated industry.
My approach is pragmatic. Regulation aims to achieve specific
goals.2 2 6  Regulation is not in place to decorate shelves with
rulebooks (or not only; leather-bound rulebooks certainly add to a
room's atmosphere). Therefore, most discussions surrounding
regulations rightly focus on what the results should be and how to
achieve them. If capture can, in certain circumstances, promote
those goals-or promote them better than other tools-it should be
used for that goal.
In that vein, when looking at the relationship between industry
and regulator, we should focus on how to maximize its positive
results and minimize its dangers. To some extent, that is an
empirical question, but at least some factors can be suggested. As a
starting point, the benefits highlighted in this Article are
information, improved compliance, and avoiding unintended
consequences. The most important factors will relate to those
benefits.
A. Information
The importance of industry-only information is significant here.
A close relationship will be more beneficial where information is
really difficult or expensive to come by without industry cooperation.
226. On the reasons for regulation, see Shapiro & Steinzor, supra note 3, at
1741.
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The problem is that the risks of a close relationship-because of the
difficulty of verifying the information-are also extremely real in
this situation. If industry knows its information cannot be verified,
and especially if there are other pressures, it may be tempted to
massage such information. This may be a situation where a close
relationship between industry and regulator is essential, but close
external supervision of the regulator-or at least occasional close
scrutiny-is a necessary corollary. At least some literature suggests
that monitoring itself can prevent abuse. 227
A stronger factor is where within industry information is
available. Industry is not one skin. While the question needs
empirical investigation, I suggest that the benefits will be higher
where the information an agency needs is in the hands of the lowest
and highest echelons of industry, in contrast to middle managers.
Lowest echelons may have less incentive to hide information from
agency and, if the relationship is good, may be closer to the
regulator than to management. They are also the ones that may
suffer from some problems-such as airline accidents. Highest
echelons may buy into the regulatory goals, and at any rate, have
much to lose from scandals. 228 But middle managers, who are often
under substantial pressure to get results and get things done, may
find themselves cutting corners more often and may wish to hide
those cut corners from both management and regulators.
Second, while the risks do exist, the benefits are higher when
understanding the way industry works "on the ground" is critical to
effective regulation. As pointed out by Makkai and Braithwaite:
[IInspectors who come from the industry bring with them not
only some special insight into the difficulties the industry
faces, but they also bring special insight into the tricks of the
trade used to get out of those difficulties. Industry experience
can be helpful in finding the skeletons in the corporate closet.
Admittedly, inspectors take the tricks of the regulatory trade
across to the industry as well. But it is clearly the government
that gets the better of this particular exchange. This is
because most of the regulator's job involves dealing with
industry, while only a little of the business person's job will
concern dealing with regulators, unless she becomes a
regulatory affairs specialist in a large firm.229
227. Short & Toffel, supra note 194, at 386-87 (suggesting that monitoring
can increase compliance, though sanctions may not). For a discussion of the
literature on the issue and many more citations, see id. at 371.
228. This may lead them to try to hide problems, but in a complex
corporation, upper management may itself be unaware of the problems until
very late, and finding the information sooner will be important to them.
229. Makkai & Braithwaite, supra note 1, at 73.
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B. Compliance
The incentives for industry to comply with regulation are also
an important factor. Noncompliance can be costly for industry. One
important factor is the existence of potential victims of
noncompliance. Potential victims of noncompliance who can
complain or sue increase the risk of detection and of negative
reactions, and therefore increase industry incentive to comply with
regulation. Deaths from airplane accidents, children harmed by
specific products, and people who lost their homes following the
mortgage crisis are more likely to generate sympathy and lead to
outrage than harm to the general taxpayers' base.
The benefits to the industry from the regulatory regime are also
important; does regulation help coordinate between parts of
industry? Do regulatory requirements help management achieve
values it already wants to achieve?
Finally, there is a question of what is on the other side of the
scales. If the costs of compliance are really high, the best
relationship in the world may not push industry to comply. So if the
costs of compliance-direct or indirect-are substantial, the risks of
capture are more likely to materialize.
Second, the incentives for an agency to stay true to its mandate
are also important, and the salience of the regulated industry
matters here. A less-noticed agency may feel more comfortable
allowing industry to deviate from the public interest than one that is
under scrutiny. The FAA regularly receives critical media attention
after air crashes, leading some commentators to see it as a
"tombstone agency"-an agency that only acts when someone dies
(and in proportion to the number of deaths).230 The negative
attention puts pressure on both the FAA and the airline industry,
criticized together, to act. In that sense, a close relationship may be
a benefit. When the pressure comes from outside the agency and is
directed at both agency and industry, the close connections may
make acting more effective: "We have a common problem. Let's
solve it."
The IMS, on the other hand, was hidden from the view of
anyone outside Washington or oil companies until the scandals
related to it occurred (the accusations of corruption due to gift
taking by its employees and the accusations of lack of enforcement
of environmental regulation in connection to the BP oil spill); even
now, most people will have difficulty recognizing its name. With no
external exposure, there was no reason for the agency officials
identifying with industry to beware or act differently. In relation to
the Royalty in Kind program, there came a point where the rest of
230. COBB & PRIMO, supra note 169, at 17; see also NADER & SMITH, supra
note 11, at 61-68.
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the administrative state caught on and stepped in to correct the
problem. 231
Third, we have to ask what the real-world alternatives to
capture actually are. If an agency has enough funding and aid from
external constituencies or from other sources in enforcing rules, or is
facing a very divided industry, it may get a great deal done without
capture. In that case, the risks of capture may stand out more
(though even there, the benefits are important). But if the agency is
substantially understaffed for its assigned role, or underfunded,
capture may be the only way to get anything done. In that case,
achieving what an industry is willing to give through cooperation
and due to its good relationship with the regulator may be enough,
or at least better than nothing. Capture will provide more benefits
if there is a credible possibility of sanctions in the background.
In other circumstances, alternatives to capture may exist-
command and control regulation, or a very comprehensive process,
may be possible-but capture will still derive more benefits, or
derive them more cheaply (and so may be better).
In the words of Komesar:
The correct question is whether, in any given setting, the
market is better or worse than its available alternatives or the
political process is better or worse than its available
alternatives. Whether, in the abstract, either the market or
the political process is good or bad at something is irrelevant.
Issues at which an institution, in the abstract, may be good
may not need that institution because one of the alternative
institutions may be even better. In turn, tasks that strain the
abilities of an institution may wisely be assigned to it anyway
if the alternatives are even worse. 232
If an institution works well, but others would work better,
others should be used; if an institution has problems, but the
alternatives are even worse, that institution is the best possible for
the specific context. 233 In this context, capture, in spite of its
manifest drawbacks, can sometimes be the best alternative we have
available. Thus, before finding fault, any critic must address the
issue of what better course might have been taken.
CONCLUSION
Concerns about capture are still very real-though, these days,
the belief in the value of collaboration provides something of a
counterargument. This Article suggests a way to reconcile the
extensive literature denouncing the dangers of capture with the
231. INVESTIGATIVE REPORT, supra note 38, at 1-4.
232. KOMESAR, supra note 14, at 6.
233. Id.
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literature emphasizing the benefits of collaboration by suggesting
that indeed, there is an overlap-at least a potential overlap-
between them since both highlight a close relationship between
industry and agency, but that overlap is more than just a cause of
concern. Such a relationship has its benefits.
The devil is, as always, in the details-what is the relationship
between the regulator and the industry, who else is on the playing
field, what are we trying to achieve, and what else is available?
These are empirical questions. A blanket condemnation of close
relationships between industry and regulators by naming them
capture is problematic and can lead to sacrificing potential
advantages.
We need to start empirically studying and evaluating the
factors that make a close relationship between industry and
regulators work or vice versa. We need to tackle the formidable task
of assessing its real effects on public policy. It is formidable because
it requires defining what the "public interest" is in the relevant area
and assessing the effects on it, neither easy tasks. But it is
important.
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